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The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability
SAMUEL W. BUELL*

Application of the doctrine of entity criminalliability, which had only a thin tortlike rationale at inception, now sometimes instantiatesa socialpractice of blaming
institutions.Examining thatsocialpracticecan amelioratepersistentcontroversyover
entity liability'splace in the criminallaw. An organization'srole in its agent'sbad act
is often evaluated with a moral slant characteristicofjudgments of criminality and
with inquiry into whether the institution qua institution contributed to the agent's
wrong. Legal process, by lending clarity and authority,enhances the communicative
impact, in the form of reputational effects, of blaming an institutionfor a wrong.
Reputationaleffects canflow through to individualsin ways thatreduce probabilityof
future wrongdoing by altering individualpreferences andforcing reevaluation and
rcform of institutionalarrangements.Blame and utility areclosely connectedhere: the
impulse to blame organizationsand the beneficial effects of doing so both appearto
depend on the degree of institutionalinfluence on the agent.
These insights imply that the doctrine should be tailored,unlike present law, to
more fully exploit criminallaw's expressive capitalby selecting cases according to
entity blameworthiness. Barriers to describing the phenomenon of organizational
influence and culture prevent discovery of a first-best rule of institutional
responsibility. A second-best step would be to enhance the existing doctrine's
examination of agent mens rea, to impose fault only if the agent acted primarilywith
the intent to benefit the firm.

* Visiting Assistant Professor and Fellow, Emerging Scholars Program, University of
Texas School of Law. Email: sbuell@law.utexas.edu. Until July 2004, I was a prosecutor in
United States Attorneys' Offices and for the Department of Justice Enron Task Force and during
that time served as a lead trial counsel in United States v. ArthurAndersen LLP. The views here
are my own. Many thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Rachel Barkow, Mitchell Berman, Richard
Bierschbach, James Jacobs, Susan Klein, Douglas Laycock, Lawrence Sager, Deborah Schenk,
and Stephen Schulhofer for helpful comments and criticisms.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite sustained and deep attention,' the criminal form of enterprise liability
remains ofpuzzling legitimacy. This puzzle is well worth solving. The law and practice
of entity criminal liability have grown increasingly salient, in tandem with the growth
of the criminal law's regulatory role and the relative expansion of federal law and
enforcement in the field of criminal law.2 The market disruptions of 2001 and 2002,
and their regulatory aftermath, have accelerated entity criminal liability's growth in the
law.3
The law in this area had a weak start nearly a century ago when common law courts,
looking to expand available means for regulating business enterprises, imported
respondeat superior liability4 from tort law into the criminal law, but without serious

1. See Joseph F.C. DiMento, Gilbert Geis & Julia M. Gelfund, Corporate Criminal
Liability:A Bibliography,28 W. ST. U. L. REv. 1,5-64 (2000) (listing hundreds of works on the
subject).
2. I will speak of entity criminal liability. Most of the literature refers to corporate
criminal liability. The corporate designation may be a misnomer when authors do not limit their
arguments to the corporate form. The problem sweeps more broadly since many types of legal
entities-including partnerships, nonprofits, and even some government bodies--can be subject
to prosecution.
3. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Anne Marie Squeo, Crackdown Puts Corporations,
Executives in New Legal Peril,WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at A1 (reporting more than nine
hundred people charged in more than four hundred criminal corporate cases since 2002, and at
least eight entity criminal cases resolved with nonprosecution settlements since 2003).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (2004); PAGE KEETON & WLLAM
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theoretical analysis. 5 At least as a matter of federal law-the law that governs most
cases of criminal enterprise liability-if a master were an entity, the master could be
convicted for virtually any crime the master's agent committed within the scope of
agency.6 Inquiry into an entity's criminal responsibility would proceed no further. The
only slight modification to this rule has been to add a requirement that the agent have
acted, in some part, to benefit the master.7
Since its inception, this form of liability has faced steady criticism.8 Criminal law
scholars have doubted the doctrine's theoretical soundness, pointing to illogic in
retribution toward objects and the impossibility of fitting liberal concepts about
responsibility with nonhuman actors. Entity criminal liability, these arguments go, is a
purely imputed form of fault that has little or nothing to do with blameworthiness. And
the doctrine is concerned with the fault of something without free will or characterthat is, an apparition with "no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked." 9
Neoclassical economic analysis has propelled the critique further by leading
scholars to question even the simple regulatory rationale that first gave rise to the
doctrine. If the only pain that the state can inflict on a legal entity is fiscal, there is said
to be little point, and perhaps waste, in maintaining a dual structure of civil and
criminal enterprise liability.'0 In response to this argument, a few have reached, not yet
LLOYD PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 499-508 (5th ed. 1984).
5. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96
(1909); GLANvuiE WIuIAMs, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 853 (2d ed. 1961)
(describing the courts' acceptance of corporate criminal responsibility as "a striking instance of
judicial change in the law"); Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate CriminalLiability: What
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1486 (1996) ("Given the absence of
widespread public civil enforcement prior to the early 1900s, corporate criminal liability appears
to have been the only available option that met both the need for public enforcement and the
need for corporate liability."); Wayne A. Logan, CriminalLaw Sanctuaries,38 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 321, 353 (2003) ("[B]y the early 1900s, legislators and judges realized that the criminal
law required modification to properly account for wrongs committed by increasingly powerful
and prevalent corporate collectives.").
6. See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1250 (1979) (stating that respondeat

superior covers virtually every act that "occurred while the offending employee was carrying out
ajob related activity").
7. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'g
United States v. Thompson-Powell Drilling Co., 196 F.Supp. 571 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
8. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRB4iNAL SANCTION 360-61 (1968);
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 853-57; Albert W. Alschuler, Comment, Ancient Law and the
Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307 (1991);
Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 293-324 (1985); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens
Rea and the Corporation,19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21, 37-41 (1957); Developments in the LawCorporateCrime, supra note 6, at 1235-38, 1365-70.
9. Lederman, supra note 8, at 309 (quoting R. CROSS & P. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL LAW

122 (10th ed. 1984)).

10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of CorporatePunishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981); Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, CorporateCrime,25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996); Khanna, supranote
5; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J.
1215 (2003) [hereinafter Khanna, Top Management]; Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate
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entirely successfully, to find some utility in a separate criminal practice of institutional
liability."
Yet criminal enterprise liability has flourished in the legal system; 12 if not, persistent
interest in the doctrine would be inexplicable. Respondeat superior has become firmly
entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enterprise liability for all
manner of crimes. The use of the tool against business enterprises and other
organizations has become a prominent, perhaps central, feature of the criminal justice
system, particularly at the federal level and in matters of white-collar crime.' 3 Most
interesting, in the shadow of a strikingly broad de jure rule of liability that is nearly
indistinguishable from its civil counterparts, the criminal system's actors gradually
have developed a practice of imposing enterprise liability that looks much narrower
14
and is tied to a form of heightened criminal law responsibility.
At the same time, organizations are ubiquitous, and worries about their production
of unwanted events have increased. Institutions--our businesses, employers, schools,
nonprofits, and so on--determine the course of much of our lives and even our
identities.' 5 No matter what the law might have to say, we find ourselves continually
wondering what to do about harmful human behavior, including behavior legally
defined as criminal, that is explicable6 (even describable) only with reference to the
1
institutional settings where it arises.
Defendants and the Protections of Criminal Procedure: An Economic Analysis (Sept. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=657441) [hereinafter Khanna, Corporate Defendants].
11. See Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A StandardforImposing CorporateCriminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate
CriminalLiability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning
andthe EconomicAnalysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998); William S. Laufer & Alan
Strudler, CorporateIntentionality,Desert,and Variants of VicariousLiability, 37 Am. CiuM. L.
REV. 1285 (2000); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 23 (1997).
12. See 1 KATiEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILIT

89-145 (1992)
(collecting and summarizing cases).
13. The adoption and use of entity criminal liability is also on the rise in Europe. See Sara
Sun Beale & Adam G. Safwat, What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us AboutAmerican
CritiquesofCorporateCriminalLiability, 8 BUFF. CiuIM. L. REV. 89, 136-37 (2004).
14. See generallyKimberly D. Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct:Beyond the PrincipalAgent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
15. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 4 (1995) (explaining that a "healthy and dynamic society" consists of"a complex

welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational
institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches").
16. Recent scandals include large public companies undertaking deceptive financial
practices, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Corporate Fraud Task Force Cases and Charging
Documents, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/cases.htm; prominent professional firms failing in
gatekeeping responsibilities, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A CapsuleSocial
andEconomic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269,279-302 (2004); John R. Kroger,
Enron,Fraud,and SecuritiesReform: An EnronProsecutor'sPerspective,76 U. COL. L. REV.
57, 84-112 (2004); burgeoning charitable foundations diverting funds for the benefit of their
keepers, see Beth Healy et. al., Some Officers of Charities Steer Assets to Selves, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2003, at Al; elite academic institutions concealing patterns of wrongdoing, see
Michael Moss, PentagonFacesNew Questions on Old Problem,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,2003, § 1,
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Treatments of this problem have run in one of three directions: toward the
conclusions that retribution against nonhuman legal forms is nonsensical and pointless,
and that therefore the legal slip-up of recognizing criminal liability for entities should
be reversed; toward at least doubt, and sometimes deep skepticism, that criminal law
could add anything useful to the project of regulating firms, which can suffer only
financial consequences from legal action; or toward embrace of a popular impulse to
condemn entities criminally for the harms they visit upon people.
Only the third (and newest) of these currents in the literature has begun to explain
fully what is involved in the modem practice of imposing criminal liability on
organizations, and why the practice has been so persistent. So far, however, the
accounts have only scratched the surface of a genuine social account of entity criminal
liability. This Article delves deeper, offering the thesis that the blaming function of
entity criminal liability is linked closely to the utility of the doctrine. I will claim that
the existence of institutional influence on an individual offender explains both the
impulse to blame an entity and why such blaming can beneficially alter group behavior
to make wrongdoing in organizations less likely. These features of blaming
institutions
17
look to be inseparable, potent, and dependent upon criminal process.
This Article will develop its thesis in two primary steps. First, it will descriptively
locate the social function of imposing criminal fault on entities. I will examine the de
facto legal practice in the field of criminal enterprise liability, what is behind the
widespread social practice of blaming institutions for agents' crimes, and what results
when legal process accommodates that social practice.
Reassessing entity criminal liability in light of its contemporary social function will
yield several helpful conclusions, some of them novel. In modem life, an organization
can be blamed for wrongdoing with a kind of moral assessment characteristic of
judgments of criminality and on the basis of the organization's relationship to the
wrong. Unlike present law, social practice discriminates among cases of wrongdoing in
organizations and, in determining where to ascribe blame, considers what a given case
says about an organization and its tendency to produce unwanted individual behavior.
Effects of this kind of evaluation and condemnation can include altering an
organization's reputation. Conducting such assessments through legal process gives
at 26, Jonathan Saltzman & Heather Allen, Groton School Trustees Are Indicted, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 8, 2004, at BI; churches enabling grievously harmful conduct by clergy that
undermines the premises of systems of faith, see OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON (July 23, 2003), available at http://www.ago.state.ma.us/
filelibrary/archexecsumm.pdf; government agencies harming the public they exist to serve, see
DICK LEHR & GERARD O'NEILL, BLACK MASS: THE TRUE STORY OF AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE

BETWEEN THE FBI AND THE IRISH MOB (2001); the military spawning and fostering cruelty and
viciousness, see MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 15-22 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org
iraq/2004/prison abusereport.pdf; and respected media organizations publishing fabricated
reporting, see Elizabeth Kolbert, Tumult in the Newsroom, THENEW YORKER, June 30,2003, at
42; Jacques Steinberg, Editorof USA Today Resigns; Cites Failureover Fabrications,N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at A5.
17. See infraParts II.C-F. As that section describes, the role of blaming in entity criminal
liability is more complex than the observation that a criminal law's consistency with retributive
impulses encourages respect and compliance. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453 (1997).
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them a clarity and authority that strengthens reputational effects. Such reputational
sanctions can flow through to affiliated individuals in ways that can alter behavior,
cause re-evaluation and reform of institutional arrangements, and reduce wrongdoing
in organizational settings. Because of its communicative force and preference-shaping
authority, only criminal process fully produces these effects of legally imposed entity
blame.
Second, this Article considers what these descriptive insights mean for the law. Not
surprisingly and as many have argued, replicating the tort rule of respondeat superior
turns out to have been a wrong turn for the criminal law. Much of the confusion and
doubt surrounding entity criminal liability stems from a large gap between the terms of
the law and what the legal practice is really doing. Perhaps unexpectedly, the best
theoretical defense of criminal enterprise liability calls for limitations on the tool's use
in practice. Limiting the scope of entity criminal liability not only would make the
doctrine fit better with its justifications. It also would better exploit the criminal law in
regulating enterprises, because entity criminal liability's influence depends much more
on what the law says than on what the law does by way of formal sanctions.
This Article will thus argue for a narrower standard of liability that would seek
information about institutional effects on the individual, as revealed in the individual's
mental state toward the entity at the time of the offense. This Article's proposal will be
modest because barriers to describing the complex phenomenon of an institution's
relationship to an individual crime prevent articulation of a first-best rule. Unavoidable
gaps between the law's breadth and actual institutional responsibility mean that
enforcers should endeavor to choose cases that maximize the message effects of
imposing criminal liability on organizations. Entity criminal liability turns out to be an
instance in which enforcement actions alone, with only loose connection to legally
authorized sanctions, can send strong normative signals.
In Part I, I will offer two cases to illustrate the nature of current legal practice and to
pose questions that necessitate further inquiry into the function of entity criminal
liability. In Part II, I will begin to descriptively answer those questions; that is, I will
examine the phenomenon of criminal entity liability in order to determine its social
function and to explain its distinctive and useful purposes.
In Part III, I will consider implications of this Article's findings. I will argue that a
narrower form of criminal entity liability would better serve its distinctive purposes.
Finally, I will consider what this Article's analysis means for understanding the power
of enforcement practices to determine the normative messages of the criminal law.
I. THE NATuRE OF THE PROBLEM
Let us begin with two concrete and recent examples that show that entity criminal
.liability can involve evaluation of behavior in institutional settings in ways that do not
fully arise in cases of individual criminal liability or civil enterprise liability. After
examining these cases, this Part will pose a series of questions about the function of
entity criminal liability that will frame the theoretical analysis that follows in Part II.
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A. Example: United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP

Most readers will recall United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP 8 as a case about
large-scale shredding of documents at the giant auditing firm in the midst of a
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation of the Enron Corporation.
Enron's collapse made it the leader in the financial upheavals of 2001 and 2002.
Because of the Supreme Court's later review of the case, Andersen may become best
known as a case about the line between criminality and permissible adversarial
behavior when it comes to document destruction.
Before Supreme Court review, however, Andersen primarily told a story about
criminal enterprise liability. 19 Setting aside the later controversy over the criminality of
the firm's destruction of Enron-related documents,20 at the time of the conduct,
indictment, and trial, the firm seemed to be easily liable for its agents' acts on the strict
terms of respondeat superior. Yet the question of whether the firm was to blame for
what its employees did was substantial, challenging, and fully debated by the
participants in the case.
1. Conduct
Consider the document destruction in its institutional context. Andersen, a limited
liability partnership, was one of the largest global auditing firms. By June 2001, it had
acquired probationary status after its chief regulator, the SEC, charged the firm for
permitting one of its largest clients to publish misleading financial statements.2 1 At the
same time, Enron, a Houston company that was the nation's seventh largest, had
become Andersen's second-biggest client, generating about $50 million in annual fees
that were projected to rise to $100 million. 22 For several years, many of Andersen's
senior partners knew that Enron's financial practices were "aggressive" and "high-

18. 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005).
19. One authority has already examined the merits of the Andersen prosecution and
Andersen's approaches to defending itself. Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's FallfromGrace,81
WASH. U. L.Q. 917 (2003).
20. For the controversy regarding the criminality of the firm's document destruction, see
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005); United States v. Arthur
Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005); United States v.
Khatami, 280 F.3d 907, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301
(11 th Cir. 1998), overruledin part by Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129
(2005); United States v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2001) with 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2004) and 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2004).
21. Transcript of Record at 448-58,460-89, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H02-121 (S.D. Tex. June 15, 2002) [hereinafter Transcript of Record]. Andersen's settlement with
the SEC in the case was unprecedented among the "Big Five" accounting firms in the size ofthe
fine and the gravity of the non-monetary sanctions. See Government Exhibits 120B, 120C,
120D, 120E, 120F, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121 (S.D. Tex. June 15,
2002) [hereinafter Government Exhibit(s)].
22. Government Exhibit, supra note 21, 0206A.
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risk,, 23 colloquialisms in the auditing industry for likelihood of legal action and
liability of the auditor.
Enron's public unraveling began when its chief executive officer surprisingly
announced his resignation for unspecified reasons just six months after his
appointment, a move that puzzled Wall Street.24 Almost immediately, serious
25
accounting troubles at Enron commanded the attention of Andersen's partners.
Within a few weeks, the number of Andersen personnel handling the growing crisis at
Enron widened to over a dozen senior partners.26 It was immediately apparent to this
group that, at a minimum, Enron was on the verge of reporting its first large earnings
loss in many quarters and of announcing a downward correction of $1 billion in an
erroneous entry for shareholder equity.27 The group also seriously deliberated over
whether the company would have to file a large restatement (correction) of past
reported earnings, a sometimes devastating
market signal that nearly always draws SEC
28
scrutiny of both auditor and client.
Not surprisingly, Andersen's legal department in Chicago quickly assigned a legal
partner (Nancy Temple) to participate in the partnership group's daily deliberations
over Enron. 29 Within a few days, she took many steps showing that she and other
Andersen partners viewed the Enron crisis as a serious liability problem for Andersen
that could lead to further SEC action against the firm.3 °

23. See Transcript of Record, supranote 21, at 819-23,940-41, 1119, 1733-42, 1847-48,
3270, 5290, 5529-30,6004.
24. Id. at 655-57; Government Exhibit, supra note 21, 0828B.
25. A senior Enron and former Andersen employee (Sherron Watkins) told Enron's general
counsel that she was nervous about recent transactions; at one point Watkins said she feared
"that Enron would implode in a wave of accounting scandals." Transcript of Record, supranote
21, at 806-19, 2804; Government Exhibits, supra note 21, 0821A, 3009C. More specific
troubles came with Enron's decision to close down a series of large "aggressive" financial
structures and report an earnings loss of hundreds of millions of dollars. Transcript of Record,
supra note 21, at 1834-40.
26. These included the chief "relationship" partner in Houston, his several local partners
also responsible for the audit, his regional supervising and consulting partners, the firm's top
technical accounting partners at its Chicago headquarters, and several of the firm's most senior
partners globally responsible for "risk management."
27. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 970-71, 5578-83.
28. The Chicago experts discovered that the Houston team had authorized Enron to apply
an incorrect accounting treatment to the aggressive financial structures that the experts viewed

as a "black-and-white" violation of generally accepted accounting principles. Id. at 5572-79.
Moreover, the experts had explicitly advised against this technique months earlier, but were
never told that the local auditors disregarded the advice. Id. Enron's overstating of its
shareholder equity by more than $1 billion was also a possible cause for restatement. Id.at 97071, 1833-40, 5578-83. According to one Andersen partner, it was "as sure as night follows
day" that litigation and an SEC investigation would follow a large earnings restatement. Id. at
6013-14, 6087.
29. Id. at 2878, 5588. Temple, who specialized in accountant liability work, was a former
litigation partner at one of the largest national law firms. Andersen's most senior technical
accounting expert knew of no other instance in which an Andersen lawyer participated in similar
accounting decisions. Id. at 5583-84.

30. For example, she retained litigators at one of the largest New York law firms to serve as
outside counsel; she obtained names of expert accounting witnesses who might be able to testify
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Just as she was taking these anticipatory steps, Temple began to call the attention of
the auditors on the Enron account to Andersen's document "retention" policy and to
urge compliance with it.3mThis policy stated that one central set of firm work-papers
should be created and retained, as required by accountants' professional rules,32 and
that all other audit-related documents, including drafts, hand-written notes, emails, and
other computer files, should be permanently deleted or destroyed.33 On October 12, she
sent to a regional supervising partner in Houston an email saying that it "might be
useful" to remind Andersen's team working on the Enron matters to follow the
document policy; 34 this email repeated what she had said orally and would say at least
once more in conference calls among senior Andersen partners about the Enron
crisis. 35 After receiving Temple's October 12 email, the supervising partner quickly
36
forwarded it to the lead partner responsible for the Enron account (David Duncan).
When Enron publicly announced the surprising and large earnings loss on October
16 and obliquely disclosed the $1 billion equity mistake,37 the market and the SEC
reacted with alarm. The company's stock price dropped sharply, and the next day, the
SEC sent Enron a letter disclosing that it had opened an investigation and requesting
3
production of documents and information about Enron's structured finance activities.
Enron shared the letter with Andersen.
On the morning of October 23, Duncan and several other Andersen partners in
Houston responsible for the Enron account listened to an Enron conference call with
Wall Street analysts. The call went badly for Enron and included pointed questions
about Enron's "aggressive" accounting structures and the SEC's investigation. 39 After
the call, the Houston partners agreed it would be a good time to update the Andersen
auditors working on the Enron account about the situation and instruct them, as the
Chicago office had requested, to ensure that they complied with the firm's document
policy.4° They called an unusual team-wide meeting that emails described as "urgent"
and "mandatory. ' 41 At the meeting, the partners distributed copies of the policy and
for Andersen; she discussed with senior partners in Chicago that an SEC investigation was
"likely" and that the SEC might charge Andersen with violating an injunction in the Waste
Management settlement; and she advised auditors working on the Enron account to leave out of
work-paper documents the names of certain people who had participated in conversations so
that they would not be called as witnesses. Government Exhibits, supra note 21, NT-0928 to
NT-undated, 1018B, 1025F.
31. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1367-68,5617-27; Government Exhibits, supra
note 21, 1012A.
32. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 563.
33. Government Exhibit, supranote 21,160A. However, in cases of"threatened litigation,"

no such materials were to be destroyed. Id. The policy incorporated by reference another policy
that specified regulatory scrutiny and potential restatement as situations requiring auditors to
consult the firm's legal department and therefore implied that documents should be retained in
those circumstances. Id. 160B.
34. Id. 1012A.

35. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1367-68.
36. Government Exhibit, supra note 21, 1012A.
37. Id. 1016A, 1016B.
38. Id. 1020A.
39. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1875-80.
40. Id.
41. Government Exhibits, supra note 21, 1023F, 1023H, 1023K.
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Duncan said, "I'm not telling you to go shred a bunch of documents or anything,
2 but
you need to make sure you're in compliance with the firm's retention policy."4
The Andersen employees in Houston promptly followed instructions and, as the
firm policy provided, destroyed a very large quantity of non-work-paper documents,
such as notes, drafts, and emails.43 Over the next week, the Andersen team responsible
for Enron (and only those employees) shredded thousands of pounds of Enron-related
documents and deleted unknown quantities of computer files, numbering at least in the
thousands. 44 Andersen's employees had never previously been urged to make
compliance with the firm's document policy a priority and many were unaware of its
existence before October 2001 .
The destruction stopped on November 8-the same day Enron publicly announced a
restatement of earnings-when the SEC served Andersen with a subpoena for all of its
documents relating to Enron. The subpoena called for not just the official work-paper
documents but also all of the non-work-paper documents that had been destroyed, such
as emails, drafts, and notes.4 Temple now sent a second email to Houston; this one
contained detailed instructions to retain all forms of Enron-related documentation.448
Duncan's secretary forwarded it to the team with the caption, "Stop the Shredding!,
A number of factors explained the concerted directives and destruction in Andersen
as institutional products of the firm. First, several important partners took independent
action to bring about the document destruction.' 9 Second, a theory of a bad apple or
two did not fit. Such conduct would have been practically impossible to pursue in an
environment involving real attention to public duties. Temple was an accomplished

42. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 3237. In other settings that day, partners urged
underlings to comply with the policy. In one instance, a partner confided to a manager that if he
talked about "getting rid of documents ... it would always be along the lines of being in
compliance with the firm's retention policy." Id at 3243.
43. See id. at 3232-48, 3896, 3951, 3954-55, 3990, 4171-75, 5766-67, 5783-89.
44. See id. at 3232-48, 3896, 3951, 3954-55, 3990, 4171-81, 5766-67, 5783-89;
Government Exhibits, supra note 21, 180C, 180D. Previously, the Andersen team responsible
for Enron had shredded, at most, about 100 pounds of documents in any prior week. Id. 180C,
180D.
45. See e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1201, 1379-81. Andersen's most
senior accounting expert had never been informed of the existence ofthe document policy in his
thirty years at the firm. Id. at 5618. Accounting experts in Chicago, whom Temple also
instructed about the policy, deleted large quantities of emails, their primary means of
communication with auditors about accounting issues. They deleted only emails relating to
Enron. Id. at 978-85, 1622-44, 5615-29.
46. Id. at 508-11; Government Exhibit, supranote 21, 1108C.
47. Government Exhibit, supranote 21, 11 10A.
48. Id. 11 OB. The email stated that all document destruction should stop since Andersen
had been "officially served" for its records. Id.
49. Temple thought of the idea of pushing compliance with the moribund document policy
and suggested it to her colleagues, some of whom seconded her recommendation, but she did
not follow up or supervise the destruction in Houston. Houston partners received the suggestion
and decided on their own to organize many employees there to shred documents, without further
consulting the hierarchy in Chicago. At the same time, other senior partners in Chicago followed
Temple's suggestion, recommending it to others and destroying their own Enron-related
documents, but without further consulting her or being aware of the destruction in Houston.
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lawyer, 50 while Duncan was celebrated within Andersen as a model partner.5 1 Third, no
one stepped forward to question the fairly overt
instructions to destroy documents or
52
the heavy shredding that went on for days.
Fourth, the conduct in Andersen, unlike that in many white-collar crimes, did not
have a direct monetary reward. Andersen's partners were certainly motivated
financially, but their compensation and incentives paled compared to that of their
clients at Enron and other large companies. More significant, destroying the documents
would have helped the likes of Temple and Duncan only if it helped thefirm come out
better in its next dust-up with the SEC. The partners perceived that the firm's interests
dictated that they destroy the documents. There was no suggestion, and still has been
none, that Duncan, Temple or anyone else at Andersen was seeking to cover up an
instance of criminality that might have landed any person at the firm in prison if fully
revealed. Rather, the crisis was all about the firm's audit performance.
Finally, a variety of statements by senior Andersen partners showed that the conduct
of the partners who directed document destruction was bound tightly to the objectives
of the firm. For example, two days before Temple sent her October 12 email, a senior
Houston partner conducted a regional training session for Andersen auditors during
which he described the document policy as a justification for destroying non-workpaper documents when legal proceedings were imminent. If a document were
destroyed under the policy and litigation were filed "the next day," he said that would
be "great" because "whatever there was that might have been of interest to somebody is
gone and is irretrievable." 53 Similarly, in a series of emails, numerous senior partners
spoke of the importance of destroying "smoking guns" that, if left in the firm's official
work-papers, could be "devastating" in litigation.5 4 Another witness testified that he
unapologetically believed it was necessary to destroy "smoking guns" because he had
learned
from experience that he could not count on the legal process to protect the
55
fiin.

50. See Greg Bums, PanelSays Andersen Lawyer Lied, Cm. TRm., Dec. 18,2002, § 1, at 1.
51. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1677-79.
52. Over a dozen of Andersen's most senior global managers were party to discussions in
which pursuit of the mostly ignored document policy was urged, and dozens more of the firm's
lower level employees carried out the work of purging the record, without objection. Some
auditors in the Portland, Oregon office, to whom the instruction to implement the document
policy was conveyed, balked at the instruction because, in their view, in such crisis
circumstances, "for God's sake, just don't [destroy documents]." Transcript of Record, supra
note 21, at 5210, Andersen. However, they didn't sound the alarm. Two senior partners visiting
the Houston office noticed evidence of shredding activity and suggested to one partner it wasn't
a good idea, id.at 3667, 3808-10, 3827-28, 5901, 6185-86, but neither reported his
observations to other senior managers.
53. Government Exhibit, supra note 21, 1010B.
54. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 4698-4714. At the same time, Andersen's
number-two global partner sent his colleagues an email in which he forwarded a New York
Times article on Enron and warned that "the problems are just beginning and we will be in the
cross hairs. The marketplace is going to 'force' the SEC to be tough." Government Exhibit,
supranote 21, 1026A.
55. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 4688-93.
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Of course, such discussions alone were not criminal. 56 But they did reveal that the
conduct of the transgressing partners was a product of the firm. That is, a good partner
should push the envelope to high-risk, maximum advantage for the firm and its clients,
without regard to effects on the public or markets.5 7 Tellingly, important managers
within the firm rationalized document destruction on the eve of an enforcement
proceeding on the ground that Andersen could not trust the legal system (which was
trusting Andersen) to fairly sort the consequences of Andersen's and its clients'
conduct.58 Not surprisingly, it turned out that the Enron affair was not the only client
crisis in which an Andersen partner hastily directed the destruction of audit-related
documents. 59
2. Litigation
In light of the applicable rule, respondeat superior, one might say the matter of
whether the conduct in Andersen was institutionally produced is of little interest.
Temple and Duncan, at least, plainly acted within the scope oftheir employment and in
part to benefit the firm. Several features of the litigation in Andersen, however, exhibit
an impulse to examine institutional blameworthiness. First, as in all federal cases of
entity criminal liability, the question whether to indict the firm-and the parties'

56. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, 374 F.3d 281,297 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd 125 S.
Ct. 2129 (2005) ("There is nothing improper about following a document retention policy when
there is no threat of an official investigation, even though one purpose of such a policy may be
to withhold documents from unknown, future litigation.").
57. See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING 6-8 (2003).
58. Andersen's offense particularly threatened trust relations because the crime's setting
was the vast commercial realm where, unlike street crime, the public confidence that the justice
system and the capital markets require for effective operation depends largely on voluntary
compliance. Cf Jim Zarroli, Investment Banker FrankQuattroneIs Chargedwith Obstructing
Justice in FederalInvestigationInto His Firm, All Things Considered, Nat'l Public Radio, Apr.
23, 2003 (transcript available at LexisNexis News Database) (reporting the United States

Attorney saying, "This is the kind of case that I believe has to be brought because we simply
must enforce the honor system which is federal grand jury subpoenas. We'd love to have people
think that we can go to every office and conduct a search, but we can't. We need to rely on
people's voluntary compliance with those subpoenas."); see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SOCIETY 43 (1990) (pace Durkheim, "Social relations are... like credit relations.
.. they depend upon trust .... Breach of trust, or doubts about the strength of the guarantor, can
quickly lead to a collapse of the credit system. Consequently, individual offences must be

punished, not just because of the individual harm they do, but because of the ramifications such
violations might have at the level of the moral order itself.").
59. See Greg Farrell, 4 FormerAmerican Tissue Execs Charged,USA TODAY, March 11,
2003, at 2B (describing obstruction-of-justice charges against Andersen audit partner for
directing employees to delete emails and shred files when he learned of government
investigation of client). In Andersen, the question of institutional responsibility seemed to
surpass that of individual fault. In some cases, institutional responsibility may not just exceed
individual responsibility, it may displace it-the case even stronger than Andersen being one in

which no individual perpetrator can be identified. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Some
Observationson the Use of CriminalSanctions in EnforcingEconomicRegulations, 30 U. CI.
L. REv. 423, 431-33 (1963); Julie Rose O'Sullivan, ProfessionalDisciplineforLaw Firms?A
Response to ProfessorSchneyer's Proposal,16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 16 (2002).
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discussions about that question-was governed by detailed (but nonbinding)
Department of Justice guidelines. 60 Those guidelines, which recognize the
extraordinary breadth and lack of depth in the governing legal standard, go far beyond
the law in describing what can make a case of crime in an organization a case of
organizational responsibility. They direct the prosecutor to consider: the nature and
seriousness of the offense; the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the
organization; the organization's history of wrongdoing; the timeliness and
voluntariness of the organization's disclosure of the wrongdoing; its willingness to
cooperate; its compliance programs; any remedial actions it took; collateral
consequences to others from a prosecution of the entity; the adequacy of individual
prosecutions for the conduct; and the sufficiency of any noncriminal remedies. 6'
The prosecution guidelines do not go all the way to the assessment of institutional
responsibility that, as this Article will develop, sets criminal enterprise liability apart
from simple agency liability. However, they set terms for a discussion about
institutional blameworthiness. Indictment was sought in Andersen not because
respondeat superior easily allowed it or because the criminal process simply provided
another means of imposing costs on the firm, but because of the seriousness and
pervasiveness of the document destruction, the firm's history of treating its chief
regulator with some diffidence, the firm's failure to police its auditors' conduct and
their respect for regulatory obligations, and the firm's use of its own policy and
practices to enable the obstruction. All these facts-and those described in Part I.A. 1
that do not directly correspond to aspects of the prosecution guidelines-pointed
toward institutional responsibility.
Second, the trial in Andersen was replete with evidence that the parties thought that
institutional blame was worthy of argument, though the court's legal instructions would
have virtually nothing to say about it. For example, the parties contested whether to
apply a recognized, but somewhat controversial doctrine of aggregating the "collective
knowledge" of Andersen's agents in order to determine the "firm's" mens rea, but the
idea could not be fit with the specific intent requirement of the statute at issue.62
Admission of Andersen's behavioral history, specifically its run-ins and probationary
status with the SEC, caused serious concern, even though one might think that as

60. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporateguidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo].
61. Id. at 3.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2000) (making it a crime to "knowingly... corruptly
persuade" another to destroy evidence with intent to interfere with an official proceeding);
Transcript of Record, supranote 21, at 4339. See also United States v. Bank of New England,
N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (describing application of "collective knowledge"
instruction); Thomas A. Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology ofAggregate Corporate
Knowledge: A Deconstruction, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 210, 218-227 (1997) ("If an

organization deliberately compartmentalizes information to escape the knowledge that might
lead to its conviction, then collecting the knowledge scattered throughout its employees and
utilizing it against the organization properly imputes liability .. "); but see Eli Lederman,
Models for Imposing CorporateCriminalLiability: FromAdaptation and Imitation Toward

Aggregationand the Searchfor Self-Identity, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 641, 668 (2000) (arguing
that it is problematic to "split[] off the emotional element in criminal intent").

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 81:473

against an entity the problem of prejudice in admitting such evidence is diminished and
the grounds for relevance are quite different.63
While describing a jury's analysis of a case requires speculation, the jurors here
appeared to weigh the question of the firm's responsibility carefully. If the question
before them had been only what the spare doctrine presented-whether a single
Andersen agent, acting within the scope of employment and in part to benefit the firm,
violated the statute-then we would expect little hesitation. After all, the jury heard
Duncan-a government witness who pled guilty to committing the same crime charged
against Andersen-testify that he instructed his charges to implement the firm
document policy, knowing that this would result in the destruction of documents, in
part to keep them from the SEC. 64 Such testimony would seem to have made Andersen
guilty almost a priori,65 yet the Andersen jury deliberated for ten days. 6
More telling, the jurors sent the court a remarkable note during their deliberations,
reflecting an apparent effort to fashion their own standard of institutional
responsibility. The note read as follows:
If each of us believes that one Andersen agent acted knowingly and with a corrupt
intent, is it [necessary] for all of us to believe it was the same agent[?] Can one
believe it was
agent A, another believe it was agent B, and another believe it was
67
agent C[?]

The court permitted the jury to pursue this theory, but the jury later reported in a
special verdict that it had68reached unanimity on the guilty agent, mooting the question
of the theory's viability.

63. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b); IA WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983)
(explaining that potential prejudice could lead to a conviction not for guilt for the charged
crime, but for being a "bad man"); but see id.§ 55 (explaining that character is undeniably
relevant to probability of commission of crime). In the institutional setting, the relevance is not
to prove character as in a person's trait as a lawbreaker, but to prove that a crime derived from,
and so should be blamed on, the entity. In Andersen, the evidence was admitted even under the
settled rule, because the firm's past troubles with the SEC proved its partners' motive to
obstruct justice and their knowledge and expectations of how the SEC might proceed. See
Andersen, 374 F.3d at 288-91.
64. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 1666-73, 1904-13,2478-80,2601-02, 276668, 2771-73. There was more evidence of Duncan's guilt than his admission. See supranote 42
and accompanying text.
65. That is to say, a priori under the trial court's instructions and the prevailing
understanding of the statute at the time of the trial. The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that
the statute required proof of "consciousness of wrongdoing," not just a purpose to obstruct the
SEC. Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2136. One can only speculate whether an instruction on
"consciousness of wrongdoing" would have affected the jurors' analysis of whether there was an
agent crime, before they deliberated on the question of entity liability.
66. Criminal Docket at 21-23, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121 (S.D.
Tex. 2002).
67. Jury Note Number 9, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. H-02-121 (S.D. Tex.
2002). The jury included no lawyers.
68. Transcript of Record, supra note 21, at 6907-10, 6951-52; see also Stacey Neumann
Vu, Note, Corporate CriminalLiability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a

Guilty Agent, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (2004) (arguing novel ruling on jury's question was
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Third, consider the question of sentencing. After conviction, Andersen was
sentenced to a $500,000 fine and a period of probation. To anyone with passing
familiarity with the impact of the crime and prosecution on the firm and the public
consciousness this punishment is ironic. The court calculated the penalty--correctly
and as-required at the time-under an elaborate punishment scheme for organizations
that seeks to accomplish much that pure vicarious liability under respondeat superior
does not.69 As with the indictment guidelines for prosecutors, the sentencing guidelines
for judges call for consideration of much more about the institution than its agency
relationship to its offenders, including the organization's history of violations and the
existence and sufficiency of its efforts
to prevent, police, discover, report, and help
70
punish wrongdoing by its employees.
Punishing organizations by assessing their performance in light of a legal
responsibility for deterring and punishing crime is entrenched within the modem
practice of entity criminal liability. It is generally agreed that an optimal liability
scheme for deterring individual misconduct should include not only enterprise liability,
but also a mix of strict vicarious liability and a secondary form of liability that rewards
or penalizes organizations on the basis of their deterrence efforts, as in the federal
sentencing scheme.7'
A richer version of entity liability has been created in the shadow of respondeat
superior. Yet, in Andersen, that sanctioning scheme played little role.7 2 The impact of
the case was almost entirely about the liability phase, that is, the question of whether
the firm should bear the blame for the crime. This suggests, as this Article discusses in
depth in Part II, that criminal cases of enterprise liability Can have significant effects
that cannot be replicated by a scheme of private liability or regulation that uses only
pricing to punish or reward organizations for practices and policies pursued at the
institutional level.
Perhaps most important, the Andersen criminal case had social resonance. In spite
of its limited direct financial impact, the case appears to have broadcast a public
message with a powerful impact. According to Andersen, it was the criminalization of
the firm that doomed it; the firm repeatedly stressed that any settlement that required
admission of criminal fault would be no better than a guilty verdict after a trial,
because of the brand it would sear onto the firm. 7 Although concrete evidence is hard
correct).
69. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. MAUAIL ch. 8 (2004).

70. See, e.g., id. § 8C2.5.
71. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, ControllingCorporateMisconduct:An
Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 735-41 (1997).
72. One might object that an important feature of the organizational sanctioning scheme is
the government's power to revoke licensure and that, as a result of prosecution, Andersen faced
loss of its right to practice before the SEC, a virtual death sentence for an auditing firm.
However, the SEC was not required upon conviction to permanently deprive Andersen of its
license. Revocation could have been accompanied by reinstatement, an arrangement discussed
in settlement negotiations with Andersen.
73. But see TOFFLER, supranote 57, at 1(quoting a former Andersen managing partner at a
1999 training program as saying, "The day Arthur Andersen loses the public's trust is the day
we are out of business."); Bamaby J. Feder & Steven Greenhouse, Andersen Says It Is Losing
Clients, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2002, at C1 (reporting, before any clear prospect of criminal
indictment, that Andersen was losing clients as a result of Enron's collapse); Jonathan D. Glater,
PartnerDrainCrimps Futureat Andersen, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2002, at Cl (reporting that in
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to come by on such a question, it is reasonable to conclude (if for no other reason than
the massive, and at times feverish, attention the case attracted in the press) 74 that
Andersen also altered attitudes within the financial services industry and firms more
generally. Andersen drew attention to a firm's reputation as capital, and the
vulnerability of that capital in the criminal process. 75 And the case made clear that
criminal entity liability was more than a lever for the acquisition of evidence of
individual crime; sometimes at least, firms would face prosecution, qua firms, because
they had produced harm in ways that made them blameworthy.
B. Example: United States v. KPMG LLP
A similar story is visible in the largest potential case of entity criminal liability since
Andersen: the troubles of the auditing firm KPMG LLP arising from its tax shelter
practice. KPMG recently entered into a comprehensive settlement with the Department
of Justice in which prosecution was "deferred" (a felony charge was filed and is
pending, but will be dismissed if the firm fully complies with the settlement). In that
settlement, the firm admitted criminal wrongdoing in the design and marketing of
abusive shelters, agreed to pay over $400 million in penalties, agreed to cease aspects
of its tax work, and consented to intrusive oversight of its tax practices by an outside
monitor with considerable powers.76
Though a trial might have revealed fully whether the criminal conduct of KPMG's
tax partners could be said to have been a product of the firm, 77 the settlement, and
limited public documents, strongly imply that the KPMG case is like Andersen, and

advance of trial, the firm considered bankruptcy filing and selling business units).
74. A search in the LexisNexis News database for all documents containing all of the terms
"Andersen," "Enron," and "obstruction ofjustice" between January 1,2002, and June 30,2002
(roughly the period from revelation of Andersen's document destruction through the conclusion
of the criminal trial) produces results numbering over the limit of 3000 at which LexisNexis
terminates a search. A LexisNexis search using the same terms during the same period in just
The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal,The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles
Times produces 1581 results.
75. See Monica Langley, Behind CitigroupDepartures:A Culture Shift by CEO Prince,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,2005, at Al (reporting that in response to a series of regulatory problems,

the new CEO of a massive financial services firm emphasized "shoring up the firm's reputation
and regulatory relations with a new concentration on internal controls and ethics"); Floyd
Norris, Who KilledAndersen? It Was Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at C l (reporting that a
twenty percent increase in incidence of public companies' financial restatements from 2003 to
2004 suggests that the remaining major audit firms are more willing to stand up to clients in the
wake of Andersen's collapse); Kara Scannell, KPMG Apologizesfor Tax Shelters, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2005, at A3 (reporting that the audit firm quickly took responsibility for illegal conduct
of partners involving abusive tax shelters and obstruction of justice when it was revealed that

the government was considering criminal indictment of the firm, reflecting "a broader change in
attitude among corporations facing regulatory scrutiny, with many racing to cooperate by
turning over damaging information and jettisoning culpable employees").
76. Agreement on Deferred Prosecution, U.S. Department ofJustice-KPMG LLP, Aug. 26,

2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter KPMG Settlement].
77. More of that story might be revealed if there is a trial of the numerous individuals who
face criminal charges for the shelter abuses. See Indictment, United States v. Jeffrey Stein, No.
05 Crim. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (on file with author).
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perhaps even more institutionally anchored. KPMG admitted that it "[a]ssisted high net
worth United States citizens to evade United States individual income taxes on billions
of dollars in capital gain and ordinary income by developing, promoting[,] and
implementing unregistered and fraudulent tax shelters. ' 8 It further admitted that the
"conduct was deliberately approved and perpetrated at the highest levels of KPMG's
79
tax management, and involved dozens of KPMG partners and other personnel.
Many of these partners, KPMG admitted, were promoted to leadership positions and
were compensated for their aggressiveness in marketing shelters.80 To the extent the
firm had any controls in place against such conduct, the firm admitted that tax
managers were permitted to override those controls. 8' KPMG further admitted that it
took extensive steps, through the actions of numerous partners, to conceal the abusive
shelters from
regulators and to thwart later regulatory inquiries into its shelter
82
activities.

A congressional subcommittee that investigated KPMG's shelter activities
concluded that the firm "pressured its tax professionals to generate new ideas, move
them quickly through the development process, and approve, at times, illegal or
potentially abusive tax shelters."8 3 Documents uncovered by this subcommittee
revealed senior KPMG partners pressuring employees to "sell, sell, sell"; observing
that "[w]e are dealing with ruthless execution, hand-to-hand combat, blocking and
tackling. Whatever the mixed metaphor, let's just do it."; and concluding in one
instance that "we should be paid a lot of money here for our opinion since the
transaction is clearly one the IRS would view as falling squarely within the tax shelter
orbit." 4 One expert, who closely examined one of the shelters that KPMG admitted
was fraudulent, concluded, "KPMG culture considered the shelter to be fair game to
apply against the United States, whereas the tax profession as a whole has reached
a
85
consensus.., that the shelter did not meet minimum professional standards."
KPMG, unlike Andersen, decided to handle its criminal enterprise liability through
settlement.8 6 The KPMG settlement, though not unprecedented in cases of potential

78. KPMG Settlement, supra note 76, Statement of Facts 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
81. Id. at94.
82. Id. at 9M 23-24.
83. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS IN THE

U.S. TAx

SHELTER INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 109-54, at 6 (2005).
84. Calvin H. Johnson, Talesfrom the KPMG Skunk Works: The Basis-Shift Shelter, 39
TAX NOTES 435, 436 Aug. 1, 2005.
85. Id. at 437; see also Lynnley Browning, HowAn AccountingFirm Wentfrom Resistance
to Resignation,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, at 1 (quoting a former member of KPMG board as
saying, "We came to the party late. We drank more, and we stayed longer.").
86. Andersen rejected offers of deferred prosecution settlements both before and after
indictment, on the ground that any admission of criminal fault (of the type KPMG made
unambiguously) would doom the firm. One difference between the two cases might be the extent
of potential civil liability each firm faced. An admission of criminal obstruction ofjustice might
have hobbled Andersen in litigating multi-billion-dollar civil class action claims for accounting
fraud filed on behalfofEnron shareholders. KPMG's civil liability runs only to those taxpayers
who purchased, and relied to their detriment, on the abusive shelters. See also infra note 153
(further discussing civil-criminal interactive effects).
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entity criminal liability, is remarkable for how far it extends beyond monetary
sanctions. It requires KPMG to abandon numerous components of its tax practice; it
imposes minimum thresholds of likelihood of success that must be met for KPMG to
provide any client with an opinion supporting a tax position; it creates a mechanism for
centralized review and approval of all significant tax opinions generated within the
firm; it requires KPMG to implement and maintain a new compliance and ethics
program; and it imposes an independent monitor on KPMG, for a period of at least
three years, who has access to all firm records and personnel, powers to review
compliance programs and personnel decisions, and duties to report regularly to the
court and prosecutors. 87 The KPMG settlement appears to be designed, above all, to
cause fundamental institutional change, through both its reform measures and its
requirement that KPMG fully concede at the outset, to itself and the public, that the
criminal conduct of its partners was, in part, thefirm's responsibility.
C. Questions About ContemporaryEntity CriminalLiability
Both Andersen and KPMG illustrate that institutional forces and institutional
blameworthiness, not mere agency relationships, shape the contemporary practice of
imposing criminal liability on firms. Neither result examined here-the highly public
and reputationally important resolution of a dispute over whether a firm was
responsible for producing its agents' bad acts, or the reform of a firm to ensure that it
produced no further criminality-would have been possible in the absence of a blamedriven practice of entity criminal liability.
The features of organizational criminal cases like Andersen and KPMG call for
evaluation of several phenomena, and their interaction, in both social practice and legal
practice. Such cases imply a series of questions. As a matter of social fact, can we say
that institutions produce crime? Do we have a settled practice of, in some instances,
judging institutions responsible for criminal behavior? If both of these phenomena
exist, are they linked? Does blame tend to arise when institutions actually produce
crime?
Does the legal practice of blaming institutions involve de facto standards of
institutional responsibility, even though its de jure scope is simple agency liability?
What might imposition of institutional blame through legal process, and particularly
criminal process, add to the social phenomenon of blaming organizations?
We then need to ask what effects a legal practice of institutional blaming might have
on human behavior. That is, what messages might individuals take from the imposition
of criminal liability on the institution, and how might those messages affect future
conduct? Are such effects desirable, and not outweighed by any costs they entail?
Finally, if the legal practice is found to be influential and desirable, we can ask whether
any civil or regulatory regime could have similar effects and, if not, what regime of
criminal law might optimally produce such effects.
This Article will proceed through these questions, in an effort to specify the
justification for criminal enterprise liability and to suggest how the contours of liability
might be refashioned to better fit and serve that justification. Doing so, it is hoped, will
suggest a means of putting this somewhat troubled subject to rest.

87. KPMG Settlement, supra note 76.
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II. FUNCTION OF ENTITY CRIrvINAL LIABILITY

In this Part, I will argue that the social practice of sometimes blaming institutions
for the wrongdoing of indviduals has foundation and explanation. Institutions influence
people in ways that sometimes make it rational to blame institutions for what people
do. Criminal legal process, I argue, gives communicative force to an instance of
institutional blame and provides an external viewpoint that is inaccessible to an
institution's members.
Further, the criminal process can impose a unique form of reputational sanction, the
effects of which can flow through to institutional members in ways that promise to
deter individual wrongdoing and promote group endeavors toward compliance. No
non-criminal legal process can fully replicate these effects.
In this Part, I will also consider some countervailing considerations, such as the
concern that enterprise liability's effects may unfairly harm "innocents." I will
demonstrate why these considerations do not call for the wholesale rejection of entity
criminal liability. Finally, I will summarize my analytical conclusions and describe
areas in which empirical information is lacking and could assist more decisive
resolution of the problem.
A. The Social Practiceof Blaming Institutionsfor Crime
It is a fact of contemporary life that our conception of responsibility includes beliefs
about institutional responsibility.8 8 When we say, in a matter of importance involving
serious harm, that "the school knew" or "the power company ignored" or "the
manufacturer covered up," we mean much more than that somebody who worked there
knew, ignored, or covered up.8 9 We mean something about the entity qua entity.
McDonald's markets. The Pentagon conceals. The police force refuses. The church
enables. The university discriminates. And so on. This is our discourse about how

88. See PETER CANE, RESPONSIBLITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 4-6 (2002) (explaining that
"conventional" responsibility is "responsibility practices and .. the concepts and ideas of
responsibility on which they are based," that is, "a set of social practices"); D.E. Cooper,
Collective Responsibility, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FivE DECADES OF DEBATE IN
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETincs 35 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (Because

"[b]laming attitudes are held towards collectives, as well as towards individuals," we must
decide whether (1) such ascriptions are misuses of the term "responsible," (2) such ascriptions
are reducible to statements about individual responsibility, or (3) collective responsibility is not
reducible to individual responsibility.); Nicola Lacey, Responsibility andModernity in Criminal
Law, 9 J. POL. PunI. 249, 274-75 (2001) ("[T]he concept of responsibility can best be
interpreted in relation to the social practices out of which it arises.... [O]nce we let go of the
metaphysical fantasy that responsibility just 'is' a certain kind of thing, and think instead of
responsibility as a normative device-a matter of construction and ascription-then we can
begin to ask common questions about responsibility across social institutions.").
89. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLaw: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1517-19 (2000) (arguing that "all that is required for
collectives to be subject to expressive theories of reason and morality" is that members are
jointly committed to expressing a mental state "as a body" rather than as a collection of
unilateral acts).
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entities function in society. Working out ground rules for such talk is unnecessary. The
words themselves show that we understand entities to exist independent of individual
actors and to be responsible for consequences of actors' conduct. 90 The meaning of
such talk grows stronger when we speak this way about whether the school, the power
company, or the manufacturer should be criminally convicted for the knowing, the
ignoring, or the covering up. There, we mean responsibility. 91
Consider the difference between two hypothetical cases. In the first, a single driver
for Acme Express, speeding to finish her route before an hour at which company policy
says points toward qualification for an annual performance bonus must be deducted,
strikes and kills a pedestrian. In the second, ten different Acme drivers in ten different
cities, over a period of six months, each speeding to complete her route in the allotted
time, strike and kill ten pedestrians.
In discussing the first, single-incident case, most people would say, "An Acme
driver killed a man," even if it were widely understood that Acme's policy had played
some role in fostering the driver's recklessness. In discussing the second, multipleincident case, most people would say either, "Acme drivers are killing people" or
"Acme is killing people." In either explanation of the second case, the import of the
statement would be to ascribe causality and responsibility to the institution. It would be
nearly impossible to describe the event-ten deaths in ten places with common
causation-as a single phenomenon without reference to the institution.
Moreover, in referring to the institution, the description would do more than simply
signal the institution's presence. It would begin to implicate the institution. The more
deaths caused in this pattern of behavior and the more uniform the pattern, that is, the
more it appeared that the institution was at fault in what happened, the more the
reference to the institution would take on responsibility-ascribing, rather than only
descriptive, import. In the strongest case-where Acme continued to push its drivers to
hurry, from the fifth death right on through the tenth, without altering its approachstatements like "Acme is killing people" become both more likely to be made and more
deeply imbued with ascription of blame.
Of course, people--by what they do or do not do, say, write, and desire-not an
"institution" itself, behave and cause consequences. 92 Institutional responsibility for

90. See CANE, supra note 88, at 41, 144 ("[In day-to-day life we have little difficulty
attributing moral responsibility to corporations and other groups, and the law is not alone in
recognising group responsibility"; a "humanistic" approach to responsibility is at odds with law
and everyday social practice in which people "frequently attribute responsibility to groups" and
"have no difficulty with the idea that employers should accept responsibility to repair harm done
by their employees in the course of employment."); CiRISTOPHER KUTZ, CoMPLIcrrY 192 (2001)
("Political and legal life would be unintelligible and unrecognizable without... holistic talk of
groups, and without holistic systems of accountability.").
91. Cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the CorporateForm: A
HistoricalPerspectiveon CorporateSocial Responsibility4-5 (U. of Mich. John M. Olin Ctr.
for Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.comumichlwps/olin/art38 (follow "download the paper" hyperlink) (arguing that at critical junctures
in the history of the corporation over two millennia, the "real entity" theory of corporate form
repeatedly has prevailed over "aggregate" and "artificial entity" theories).
92. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSmILrrY 75 (1992); CANE, supra note 88, at 42
(arguing that incorporation should be seen in terms of regulation of group activity and
corporation should be seen as group of persons rather than as non-human person); KUTz, supra
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crime arises from institutional effects on individualbehavior.93 But we cannot describe
institutional effects solely by reference to individuals. Where those effects make the
difference in how someone behaves, we need the institutional referent to say so.
Consider how we speak coherently and continuously about institutions while
membership changes 94 and how we often cannot readily transfer our descriptions of
institutions to their constituent members." For example, we sometimes judge a
particular place to be "dysfunctional," and we say that easily, even though we might
have no particular disdain (and even great affection) for the people who work there.
Legal analysis, of course, should not accept this social phenomenon without
evaluation. We need to ask whether we are dealing with something that is the product
of cognitive error and bias, irrationality, or atavism, or whether the social practice is
empirically justified.96 If we satisfy ourselves on this score, we then can move to
consider the relevance of the legal process to this practice of institutional blame.
B. The RelationshipBetween Institutions and Crime
The social practice of institutional blame may be an exception to the fundamental
attribution error. Sometimes, it turns out, we do get context. People understand
institutional influence, even if they cannot always see it in themselves.97
Ample empirical study establishes that people often behave differently-sometimes
better, sometimes worse-in institutional settings. The truth is that institutions do
produce wrongdoing. Instrumental legal analysis often has treated the collective entity
solely as a vehicle that the state may wish to employ, through sanctioning, as a
surrogate regulator to discourage individuals from pursuing their own preferences in

note 90, at 112 ("collective action and intention is nothing but the action and intention of
participating individuals").
93. See CANE, supra note 88, at 145 (explaining that "because most forms of legal
responsibility are ultimately responsibility for human conduct and its outcomes," law starts with
a paradigm of individual responsibility as a precondition, but that paradigm does not mark the
boundary of responsibility, since responsibility practices aim to repair harm and groups cause
harm).
94. See Cooper, supra note 88, at 37; BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS,
CRimE AND AccouNTABiLrrY 22 (1993).

95. Cooper, supra note 88, at 39 ("[T]he description of... stew as delicious cannot be
reduced to descriptions of each ingredient as delicious.").
96. Lawrence Solan observes that "people are designed to be moral actors" and the impulse
to blame tends to occur "just when our theory of morality says that indignation is appropriate."
Lawrence M. Solan, CognitiveFoundationsof the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1003,
1004 (2003). However, perceptions of causation also drive the psychological impulse to blame
and "we do not want to blame people for every harm [people] cause, and we want to distinguish
among different causal situations." Id. Thus much doctrine corrects for over-blaming and underblaming. Id. (using examples of justification and excuse as correcting for over-blaming, and
inchoate liability as correcting for under-blaming).
97. See generally Donald A. Dripps, FundamentalRetributionError:CriminalJustice and
the SocialPsychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003) (discussing effort to determine

where criminal law does and does not adequately account for fundamental attribution error); see
also Ferdinand Schoeman, Statistical Norms and Moral Attributions, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS INMORAL PSYCHOLOGY 287,287-88 (Ferdinand
Schoeman ed., 1987) (arguing that law often guards against fundamental attribution error).
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ways that harm others. 98 But the complete account of the institution recognizes that it
99
drives individual behavior, not just limits (or fails to limit) it.
Freud described group psychology as "concerned with the individual man as a
member of a race, of a nation, of a caste, of a profession, of an institution, or as a
component part of a crowd of people who have been organized into a group at some
particular time for some definite purpose."' l He found its mandate in "the surprising
fact" that the person whom psychology understood one way "thought, felt and acted in
quite a different way from what would have been expected" as a result of"his insertion
into a collection
of people which has acquired the characteristic of a 'psychological
10 1
group.""
This understanding of psychology has been durable. "[G]roups are not only external
features of the world that people encounter and interact with, . . . they are also
internalizedso that they contribute to a person's sense of self. Groups define who we
are, what we see, what we think and what we do."' 102 A leading, empirically sturdy
theory of social psychology examines people's "social identity" as "their definition of
themselves in terms of group memberships" and argues for "more emphasis to the way
in which the psychology of the individual
is a product of group life and its distinct
10 3
psychological and social realities."'

98. For a comprehensive survey of such instrumentalist accounts of the entity, see Daryl J.
Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REv. 345 (2003). Some instrumental accounts
recognize that organizations can encourage wrongdoing, through compensation and promotion
policies and practices, but such accounts tend to do so under models that consider only
economic incentives, not more subtle (and possibly more powerful and intractable) behavioral
influences that may operate in institutional settings. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 71, at
702-03.
99. See, e.g., ARLE RUSSELL HOCHSCRILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME &
HOME BECOMES WORK 204-05 (1997) (explaining that modem theories of corporate
management depart from "Taylorist worldview" of industrial revolution, which was premised on
coercion of worker, to "Total Quality" models that teach empowering worker in order to draw
worker into firm culture); MAY, supra note 92, at 73 (arguing that groups change values of
members to breed conformity by (1) structures, procedures, and policies (or their absence) that
instill group values, and (2) solidarity, camaraderie, common interest, and alienation from
others). These kinds of insights, while gaining influence over time, are not new to the study of
crime in business associations. See EDwIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT
VERSION 240 (1983) (discussing hypothesis of "differential association," posited by pioneer in
field, that states "criminal behavior is learned in association with those who define such criminal
behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably").
100. SIGMUND FREuD, GRouP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EO (1921) reprinted
in 18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD,
1920-1922, at 70 (James Strachey et al. eds., The Hogarth Press 1955).
101. Id. at 72.
102. S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL IDENTITY
APPROACH 22 (2001) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 26; see also John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious
OrganizationalCorruption,70 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1177, 1191 (2005) ("When an individual is a
member of a group, in the sense that she is committed to the purposes of the group and that a
group has tasks to do, the task of the individual is to first become a prototypical member of that
group, and then help the group as best she can in reaching its goals ....[T]his may mean
adopting the moral perspectives of the group."); Michael A. Hogg, A Social Identity Theory of
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Group membership serves as the primary means by which people reduce uncertainty
about who they are and how they should behave, and decide whether to follow views
discordant with their own.'14 The most influential group leaders are those who saliently
exhibit characteristics prototypical of the group.10 5 This salience empowers them to
engage in "entrepreneurship of identity," that is, to manage the group's norms and
prototypes through talk that accentuates the prototype, pillories deviants, and
demonizes outgroups.l16

Misbehavior is a common product of the institutional setting that should draw
serious concern. People are more dangerous to society when they do bad things
together. 10 7 They are more likely to stray when among peers and more likely to hurt
others more seriously when acting together.10 8 As John Darley summarizes from a
wealth of study on this subject, "[M]any evil actions are not the volitional products of
individual evildoers but rather essentially organizational products that result when
complex social forces interact to cause individuals to commit multiple acts of terrible
harm."'1 9 An obvious point (but one that bears repeating, given that questions of how
Leadership, 5 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 184, 186-88 (2001).
104. See, e.g., Dominic Abrams, Margaret Wetherell, Sandra Cochrane, Michael A. Hogg &
John C. Turner, Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorizationandthe
Nature of Norm Formation,Conformity and Group Polarization,29 BRrr. J. Soc. PSYCH. 97, 98
(1990) ("[S]ocial influence results from a process of self-categorization whereby the person
perceives him- or herself as a group member, and thus as possessing the same characteristics and
reactions as other group members."); id. at 98 ("information is more influential when it has
come from consistent in-group members than from other sources"); Hogg, supranote 103, at
186-88.
105. See Hogg, supra note 103, at 188-93.
106. Id.
107. See CANE, supra note 88, at 145 (explaining that human beings, as social animals,
combine in groups to do more, both good and ill, than they can achieve alone); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1307, 1316-24, 1355-58 & nn.25-30 (2003) (citing
some of the sources at supra notes 101-06 and others as among a "wide body of psychological
research over the last century reveal [ing] that people tend to act differently in groups than they
do as individuals," and supporting law's treatment of conspiracies as specially dangerous and
harmful).
108. See Darley, supranote 103, at 1186-92 (arguing that people, including people who are
not generally unethical, are more recruitable into corrupt practices than we would think because
unethical actions often marginally expand on prior actions that were approved by the group, and
people attempt to become prototypical group members by following cues sent by actions of
prototypical group members); SusAN P. SHAPIRO, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THNKuNG ABOUT
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: MATrERS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION AND RESEARCH

7 (1980) (arguing that

role of organizations in illegality should be made explicit because white-collar crime exploits
the fact that "[o]rganizations generate new occasions for illegality, many of which are different
from traditional criminal opportunities"); Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, CorporateCrime, and
the Contingency of CriminalLiability, 149 U. PA. L. Rv. 1295, 1319 (2001) (arguing that
doctrine of corporate criminal liability constitutes recognition that "responsibility, in some
settings at least, is not fully captured by the model of individual moral agency that underlies
traditional criminal law" and that "to prevent crime, we need to direct liability not only at the
individual actor, but at the social context in which she acts-the social context that shares
responsibility for her criminal conduct").
109. John M. Darley, How OrganizationsSocialize Individuals into Evildoing,in CODES OF
CONDUcT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUsnqEss ETincs 13,13-14 (David M. Messick & Ann
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to prevent self-interested agent misconduct tend to dominate discussions of enterprise
liability) 0is that agent crimes often benefit organizations and are committed for that
reason. I
For several reasons, the problem of misconduct in organizational settings can be
virulent. People tend to experience a diffused sense of responsibility in groups and
therefore may be even less likely to prevent, halt, or refrain from wrongdoing than in
non-group settings.' At the same time, there is a "contagion" of sentiment and acts in
the group setting, driven by an urge "to remain in harmony with the many," which may
be especially responsive to "cruder and simpler emotional impulses."" 2 Put another
way, "[w]hen we act together, it becomes easy to inhabit an essentially bureaucratic
frame of mind, in which ultimate
ends are less salient than the instrumental procedures
' 3
used to effect those ends."
In addition, the interaction of cognitive dissonance with pressures on the individual
in the group setting can make it extremely difficult to recognize, reveal, or stop harmful
behavior once it begins.114 An institutional actor who commits a first, perhaps small
violation of a norm or rule is likely to rationalize the violation to herself in order to
avoid signaling guilt and insecurity to peers and supervisors. Incrementally worse
violations will be equally rationalized in order to maintain cognitive consistency. As
the seriousness of violations increases, the actor may eventually appreciate the depth of
her predicament and take increasing risks, causing greater harm, in order to avoid
detection of what began as a minor transgression. Something like this dynamic might
explain how executives at major multinationals like Enron and Worldcom pursued
5
massive, snowballing accounting frauds in efforts to keep their companies afloat."
The bearing of psychological and behavioral insights on the problem of
organizational crime is clear enough without having to go as far as Freud's
questionable conclusions that "in a group the individual is brought under conditions
which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses"
and that group psychology involves "a state of regression to a primitive mental
activity" characteristic of "the primal horde."' 1 6 The institution, of course, also
E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
110. Krawiec, supra note 14, at 27-29; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory andthe
CriminalLiability of Organizations,71 B.U. L. REv. 315, 319 (1991) (arguing that although
corporate crime sometimes benefits a firm, it is a mistake to treat management criminality as
altruistic toward shareholders since "the real aim of criminal behavior by organizations is to
advance the careers of the responsible corporate actors").
111. See MAY, supra note 92, at 73; John M. Darley, Social Organizationfor the Production
of Evil, 3 PSYCH. INQ. 199, 204 (1992) (reviewing studies concluding that participation in mass
murder "need not require emotions as extreme or demonic as would seem appropriate for such a
malignant project" and that "ordinary people can commit demonic acts"); see generally
STANLEY MIrRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AuTHORrrY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEw (1974).
112. FREUD, supra note 100, at 75 (quoting LEBON,PSYCHOLOGIE DES FOULES33 (1895)); id
at 84.
113. KUTZ, supra note 90, at 150 (emphasis in original).
114. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 89-90.

115. See Macey, supra note 110, at 326-29 (arguing that management in firms threatened
with insolvency will have a strong incentive to commit crimes to stave off insolvency, in order
to avoid the stigma associated with management of insolvent firms).
116. FREUD, supra note 100, at 74,88, 122. Freud went a further step: "[A] group is clearly
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"underpins people's ability to achieve social cohesion, to communicate effectively, to
influence and persuade each other, to act collectively, and to go beyond the call of
duty., ,17

The intuition beneath our social practice of blaming institutions may result from
keen awareness of how institutions subtly shape human behavior or it may be pure
intuition, the inevitable product of experiencing modem life as heavily determined by
the corporation, the school, the bureaucracy, the charity, and so on. Either way, our
blaming practice is rooted in the reality that, in the modem world, organizations do
influence behavior.
At a time when institutions of employment increasingly dominate Americans'
lives-indeed, may be the primary engine of socialization-the available evidence
suggests that this fact about individual behavior will only grow more important."18 We
thus can proceed with analysis of entity criminal liability in confidence that institutions
can cause harm and therefore can be blameworthy. The next question is what the law
might add to the picture.
held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than
to Eros, which holds together everything in the world?" Id. at 92.
117. HASLAM, supranote 102, at 26. There also is support in rational choice modeling for
concluding that organizational culture, at least in organizations that profit from correct
decisions-not just personal efforts-will tend to be homogeneous and determine individual
actions within organizations, not necessarily resulting in efficient outcomes. See Eric Van den
Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture) (MIT Sloan School of

Management, Working Paper No. 4553-05, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=793884; George A. Akerlof& Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the
Economics of Organizations,19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9 (2005) (demonstrating how rational choice
modeling of organizational behavior could be modified to account for how organizations alter
individuals' senses of identity in ways that change individual preferences, including by leading
workers to desire to work harder without regard to increased pay); Donald C. Langevoort,
Opening the Black Box of "Corporate Culture" in Law and Economics (Sept. 20, 2005)
(unpublished
working
paper),
available
at
http://www.law.umich.edu/
CentersandPrograms/olin/papers/Fall%202005/langevoort.pdf (describing how emerging
literature in economics treats firm culture as a coordinating device that is efficient because it
facilitates cooperative exchange within an organization and reduces defection behaviors).
Management study is another field that coalesces around the existence of organizational culture
and effects. See, e.g., EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANMzAToNAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHI (3d ed.
2004).
118. See, e.g., ELLEN GALNSKY, JAMES T. BOND, STACY S. KIM, LOiS BACKON, ERIN
BROWNFIELD

& KELLY SAKAI,

FAMiLiES AND WORK INST., OVERWORK IN AMERICA: WHEN THE

2, 7-8, 14 (2004) (finding that one-third of employees are
"chronically overworked"; 26% reported being overworked "often" or "very often" in month
preceding study, 36% reported that they did not plan to use their full vacations, and 21%
reported working during vacations); HOCHSCHILD, supranote 99, at 6, 203, 219 (finding that
percentage of married mothers in workforce rose from 12.6% in 1950 to 69% in 1994; in study
of employees at major United States corporation with "family-friendly" policies, finding most
were unable to escape work-centered lives despite strong desires to live family-centered lives;
concluding that "[t]he takeover of the home by the workplace is ... an unacknowledged but
fundamental part of our changing cultural landscape"); JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED
AMERICAN 1,25, 29 (1991) (finding that the amount of time Americans spend at work increased
over a twenty year period, to about 163 additional annual hours per worker, despite doubling of
average worker's productivity level and growth of women in workforce).
WAY WE WORK BECOMES Too MUCH
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C. The Legal Practiceof Blaming Institutionsfor Crime
A social practice of blaming institutions does not necessarily imply a legal practice
of institutional blame. One might question whether we ought to treat our legal practice
as part of the blaming process, rather than as a separate enterprise concerned only with
apportioning costs attributable to institutional activities. Indeed, even if blaming at the
institutional level furthers policy objectives by inflicting sanctions on the institution in
the form of reputational effects, as will be fully developed in Part II.D, economic
theory explains reputation as market-determined.1 19 So why not leave it to firms'
customers to impose whatever reputational sanction may be due and desirable?
Even a thin account of the function of the legal process-setting aside the existence
of sanctions and the influence of legitimacy-finds that the legal system has a
monopoly on a particularly important and strong form ofnormative expression. 120 Such
a functionalist account shows that a society will create courts to have a source of
widely available signals that assist individuals with conflicting views in achieving
mutually advantageous equilibria.121 Put in terms of the present subject, a legal practice
of institutional blame might help address conflict in differing views about whether
institutional blame is due.
If we relax the control on legitimacy, still leaving out sanctions, the case for law's
role strengthens. The legal process monopolizes its particular form of expression
because people confer special status on legal judgments. They do this not only because
it is useful to have a single source of available signals, but also because it is useful to
have a particular way of speaking collectively. A legal judgment of institutional blame
speaks much louder and more definitively than does a series of individual attitudinal
adjustments toward the institution. The legal judgment's purpose is, in part, to say that
the conclusion of blameworthiness sweeps socially and that, measured fairly and
analytically according to agreed ground rules, the conclusion has merit. In turn,
because legal process-especially criminal legal process-speaks in this authoritative
way, its expression gets attention, and therefore
is particularly influential in shaping
122
people's behavioral preferences, and so on.
This account both explains the existence of a legal practice of institutional blame
and is explained by it. As will be fully discussed in Part II.D, the serious attention that
an entity criminal prosecution garners among institutional managers, and their deep
worry about reputation, evidence that the social meaning of a legal judgment of

119. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Premiumsfor High QualityProductsasReturns to Reputations,
98 Q.J. EcoN. 659, 659-60 (1983).
120. See Richard H. McAdams, Expressive Adjudication (Illinois Law & Econ. Working
Paper Series, Paper No. LE04-006, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=601341.
121. Id. at 33-57.
122. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the CriminalLaw as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 17-18; see also Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil
Distinctionand the Utility ofDesert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 212 (1996) (arguing that in a diverse
society, criminal law may be the only mechanism that can transcend social differences to build
norms and thereby harness the power of personal relationships and morality in order to promote
compliance).
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institutional wrongdoingexceeds the social meaning ofjust an institutional wrong. For
example, there would be a significant difference in impact between wide circulation of
allegations (or even strong conclusions) that tobacco companies had deliberately
designed and manufactured cigarettes to enhance their 1addictiveness
and a civil--or,
23
even more so, criminal-legal judgment to that effect.
The point is nearly too obvious: unless it lacks any legitimacy, a system for settling
disputes will send messages that are stronger and clearer than any messages sent when
a matter is in an ex ante state of dispute, before the system has settled it. Knowing this,
persons with a stake in the dispute-not just because of penalties for losing it, but
because of desire to have their views about the dispute accepted by others-will have
strong incentive to avoid adverse judgments by the legal system.
A legal judgment about institutional fault may have a strong influence not only
because its authority sweeps widely across society, but also because it is an external
assessment of an institution. As follows from the discussion of institutional behavior in
Part II.B, people have difficulty seeing institutional influence on themselves. If not,
problems of institutionally produced wrongdoing might not arise in the first place. It is
the subtlety of group influences that explains how they succeed in altering people's
behavior, as measured against individual behavioral baselines, in ways that escape
notice and therefore do not trigger resistance or corrective action. By definition, in a
case of serious institutional lapse, harm results because the only group that could have
averted it, the insiders, failed to see a looming threat. A legal judgment that imposes
blame at the institutional level thus is apt to communicate an external identification and
description of flawed institutional influence in a manner that alerts and reorients
observers, and especially24participants, to a problem that produced harm largely because
it was not seen clearly.'
Here we should introduce a problem that will remain something of a puzzle
throughout this Article's analysis. How much does the influence of a legaljudgrnentof
institutional blame depend upon the public broadcast of that legal judgment? For the
most part, the kinds of cases this Article has discussed and will continue to consider
(Andersen,KPMG, the Acme Express example, the tobacco example, and so on) have
a public quality in common. They are important to everybody, not just to participants
in their legal outcomes.
One tempting way to define these cases as a class might be to say that they are
scandals. But the category is too broad. A scandal can involve anything from a serious
question of institutional failure and harm to a notable person's peccadillo. While media
attention might be necessary in a mass society to make entity cases matter, their special
character is not their tendency to sell papers. They happen to sell papers because
people worry about what these cases say about important and trusted entities, about

123. Cf Richard A. Nagareda, Outrageous Misfortune and the Criminalizationof Mass

Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121, 1158 (1998) (arguing that because the tort system is used in cases
of "outrageous" mass harm to assess moral blame, at times without regard to proof of causation;
this function properly belongs in legislative and prosecutorial domains ofpublic law where jury
blaming can be controlled).
124. See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate CriminalLaw: Deterrence,Retribution,
Fault,and Sanctions,56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141, 1220 (1982) (arguing that entity convictions can
strike at the desire for power and prestige and signal a need for critical reappraisal and
correction).
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ourselves and behave in groups, and about how to pursue institutional
how we organize
25
reform. 1
The relationship between the public quality of many of these cases of institutional
blame and the functions and justifications of entity criminal liability, as we will see, is
complicated and not quantifiable. For now, it suffices to note that legal judgments of
entity fault will have greater effect and wider influence in cases of greater public
attention, and to consider how a decision to emphasize the blaming function of entity
criminal liability as a distinguishing characteristic might make the relative publicity of
a case more important to a case's justification.
D. Reputation and Deterrence
Now we can examine entity criminal liability with greater precision, by considering
effects of its imposition. I will argue that imposing entity criminal liability may inflict
reputational harm at the level of the institution and that reputational effects are likely to
flow through to institutional members in ways that deter wrongdoing and encourage
compliance efforts. The following section will advance a thesis of such a reputational
and deterrent mechanism, consider evidence of its existence and operation, and
describe variables likely to determine its presence and potency.
1. Theory of Reputational Effect
Consider how legal imposition of entity blame for crime might influence practical
reasoning. 126 Deterrence theory assumes that punishing an individual for a crime sends
two messages. The specific message is to the offender: violation causes this pain we
are inflicting; if you want to avoid this pain, refrain from violating again. The general
message is to others: see this person experiencing pain; you too will experience that
pain if you violate.
When criminal sanction falls at the entity level, the reasoning process is likely to
differ. Assume-as do virtually all accounts of entity criminal liability that directly
culpable individuals should be punished, even if enterprise punishment also is
pursued.127 For those personally punished (especially by imprisonment), the message

125. A more useful definitional move might be to draw a connection between the entity
criminal case that communicates something important about blame and the mass tort case. See
Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469,483-85

(1994) ("What renders a mass tort case different is the degree to which all participants---judges,
lawyers, and litigants-must deal with the case as an institutional problem with sociopolitical
implications extending far beyond the narrow confines of the courtroom.").

126. See Lederman, supranote 8, at 314 (arguing that as matter of utility, the question about
entity criminal liability is whether it inhibits criminal activity of individuals involved in the
operation of an entity).
127. Cf O'Sullivan, supra note 59, at 22-23 (finding that managers would prefer firm
sanctions to individual sanctions if given choice). Deterrence would be hard to optimize in the
absence of individual sanctions, and a message that entity sanctions can displace individual
sanctions could severely undermine deterrence. The latter concern likely motivates the treatment
of war crimes, in which any message that "just following orders" supplies an excuse is strongly

discouraged. The special emphasis on individual responsibility in the war crimes context likely
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conveyed by individual criminal liability is likely to crowd out most or all of any
message imparted by entity liability. Entity liability thus has greatest import for those
not personally liable for the crime or not prosecuted, for whom any individual
punishments cause no pain and operate only as a general deterrent, that is, as a warning
to avoid the fate of punished colleagues.
Entity liability can inflict pain on organizational members not individually liable for
the crime. Of course, that pain may be simply monetary, as in the imposition of costs
that reduce profits enjoyed by shareholders or cause cost-cutting that reduces agents'
compensation or terminates their employment. But such financial pain can be as easily
caused by civil liability or market sanctions, and such non-criminal sanctions easily can
eclipse any fines associated with entity criminal liability. Criminal liability is
distinguished by its communicative force. By signaling entity fault for crime, criminal
liability is likely to convey that a particular institution may be flawed, unreliable, and
apt to generate future harm. Such a message is likely to cause decline in the
organization's reputational capital.
Organizational participants are likely to feel flow-through effects of such
reputational decline in at least two ways. First, their own reputations may suffer. Upon
observing an instance of entity fault for criminality, persons may be less willing to
contract with, employ, and rely upon individuals known to have contributed, in some
way at least, to the formation of institutional conditions that produced that criminality.
Individuals who wish to avoid the sting of such reputational effects have incentive to
encourage and monitor colleagues' compliance with the law.
Second, reputational effects on an entity may impact feelings of self-worth of
organizational members. In a society in which people's lives are dominated, even
defined, by their institutional affiliations, most people (and certainly all reputationally
sensitive types) 128 prefer to think of their institutions as good. People are happier, and
more likely to want to go to work in the morning, when they believe that their
organizations are accomplishing positive things. 1 29 Being told the contraryis connected to the circumstances that military organizations operate exclusively on orders
(firms do so only partially), punish breach of orders criminally (firms do so only through
employment sanctions), and authorize their members to engage in violence (only police
departments also do so). These factors strongly increase concern about the potential effects and
results of group dynamics.
128. See Kadish, supranote 59, at 437 (arguing that deterrence works not just because of the
fear of getting caught but also because of the desire not to violate law, especially among people
who think of themselves as "respectable"). As with white-collar criminalization generally, it
makes sense when analyzing entity criminal liability to take account of the particular
characteristics of its audience. See U.S. Department of Justice Press Conference Re: Charges in
Enron Case Involving Andrew and Lea Fastow, FED. NEWS SERV. (Jan. 14, 2004) (reporting
remarks of Deputy Attorney General noting that white-collar offenders are "exquisitely
sensitive" to deterrence).
129. See KurTz, supra note 90, at 137-202. Kutz questions whether entity blame is overly
diffused and therefore unable to operate effectively on the agents, especially the more senior
ones, who would be capable of reforming the entity. See also Kadish, supra note 59, at 434
(arguing that given the diffusion of responsibility, it is "unlikely" that stigma is felt by
individuals). But Kutz grants that "a holistic reproach" may change behavior within a collective,
destroy a collective, send a message to other collectives, and signal to members that they should
relocate. He concludes that "holistic obligations" may "pose deliberative problems for
participants, forcing them to think through the significance of their relationship to the collective
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particularly by an authoritative source like the criminal law-is likely to induce people
to take steps to alter their organizations in order30 to correct their own and others'
perceptions that their organizations are deficient.1
A message of institutional fault says something different than a message of
individual fault: not just that somebody pursued faulty preferences, but that the group
arranged itself badly. Such a message is apt to lead to reevaluation of group
arrangements, not just the rethinking of individual choice that might follow imposition
of criminal liability on a person. Indeed, introspection within institutions is an adaptive
behavior that can be critical to the success and, after failure, the recovery of firms.t31
The extent of both of these effects of reputational sanction on a firm is likely to vary
according to a given individual's position within the organization. The more senior and
responsible a person, or the more closely associated with the locus of the wrongdoing
in the firm, the more likely that others will conclude that the message of firm fault
conveys something significant about the individual. Likewise, more senior people and
people more proximate to the wrongdoing are likely to care more about maintaining
good firm reputation and are more capable of altering behavior and culture to address
the situation that led to the wrongdoing. Low-level employees with little discretion or
wrongdoing and, for
influence are unlikely to be able to do anything about institutional 32
the same reason, are unlikely to suffer much reputational effect.'
Flow-through reputational effects will be strongest for firm management but not
limited to that group. Consider, for example, the Andersen case. One might conclude
that a variety of Andersen's employees suffered reputational effects from the
imposition of criminal fault on the firm for the obstruction of the SEC inquiry into
Enron, including: those such as Temple who directly instigated destruction of Enron
documents; senior managers who participated in the Enron crisis and heard discussion
of using the firm's document policy but did not ensure that improper destruction was
not occurring; other senior managers who participated in instilling an attitude that
document destruction in anticipation of legal proceedings was savvy behavior; and
even lower-level employees who, without questioning the propriety of the instructions
or their own conduct, responded to directives regarding the firm policy by destroying
Enron documents, at a time when they knew legal proceedings were imminent.
structure, and to act on the basis of that understanding." KUTZ, supra note 90, at 202.
130. See O'Sullivan, supra note 59, at 41 (arguing that deterrence in the entity context
should be viewed as "catalyzing deterrence" because it incentivizes rather than inhibits); Fisse,
supra note 124, at 1160 (explaining that individual punishment says "refrain from committing
that offense," which calls only for self-denial, while corporate punishment says "refrain from
committing that offense and take such steps as are necessary organizationally to guard against
repetition," which calls for an affirmative response). But see PACKER, supra note 8, at 361
(arguing that considering the reputational effects from the "stigma of conviction itself' is largely
irrelevant to the debate over entity criminal liability because "there is very little evidence to
suggest that the stigma of criminality means anything very substantial in the life of a
corporation").
131. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1757-59 (2001) (arguing that firms
that encourage trust among participants enjoy evolutionary advantage because increased
trustworthiness makes costly opportunism less likely).
132. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (holding that liability under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) does not extend to persons who
play no role in the operation or management of an enterprise).
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This flow-through reputational effect of entity criminal liability likely also works
generally beyond the sanctioned organization's participants. As Jean Hampton
explains, punishment's lesson is one of public moral education; that is, it is directed not
only to the wrongdoer but also to society.' 33 A distinguishing function of the criminal
law is its authority to shape preferences for legal compliance. 134 Education and shaping
of tastes about institutional behavior should be valuable to a society in which
socialization, at least for adults, takes place largely within institutions. Criminal law
cannot and should not do all. of this work, any more than with individual behavior
outside the institutional setting. It probably should do little of it. 35 But there is a
margin along which it can, should, and does operate.
Observable reputational effects from imposition of criminal responsibility on a firm
likely will cause others to reflect upon their own institutions and their relationships to
those institutions in ways that will promote avoidance of institutional conditions that
can lead to crime. Managers will tend to understand their mandate to protect
reputational capital as requiring them to promote responsible, compliant behavior
within their firms. In some instances, such effects may substantially alter behavior
within an entire industry to an extent inconceivable with individual liability except
through massive prosecution efforts that usually would be neither feasible nor
desirable.
Nobody wants to work at a place with a reputation for fostering criminality, for
reasons of both self-image and economic self-interest (preservation of employment that
could be jeopardized if a business failed, prevention of taint to one's resume, and so
on). Even rank-and-file employees may respond to a visible instance of reputational
damage from crime in another institution by engaging in introspection, discussion, and
even change in their workplaces.
Evidence shows that the American workplace has become the central locus of
discourse in our polity. 36 At the same time, decline in the presence of other centers for
the exchange, creation, and implementation of ideas about change has concerned some
observers. 137 In a society centered on the workplace, law's most authoritative
communications about conduct in the workplace are likely to be highly influential.

133. See Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory ofPunishment, 13 PHIL. &PUB. AFF.
208, 212 (1984); see also JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILrrY 69 (1970) ("[Plunishment is a standard vehicle for the expression ofresentment
of injury received and also (but perhaps much less commonly) for the expression ofrecognition
and disapproval of evil."); Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal &Dan M. Kahan, Updatingthe Study
of Punishment,56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1182 (2004) ("The educational impact of the criminal
law is not a brittle Skinnerian stimulus and response, but rather one that works through a
complex process of social interaction.").
134. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 122, at 2-3.
135. See Hampton, supranote 133, at 218.
136. See CYNTHIA ESTLuND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 7, 34 (2003); FUKUYAMA, supra note 15, at 6; Cynthia Estlund, Working
Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO.L.J. 1, 6-7 (2000).
137. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 27 (2000) ("[W]e have been pulled apart from one another and from our
communities over the last third of the [twentieth) century."). Putnam, however, rejects
workplace dominance as the chief cause of declining community. Id. at 203.
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2. Evidence of Reputational Effect
a. Management Behavior
What evidence supports the conclusion that imposition of entity criminal liability
can have these reputational effects? Start with the behavior of those who should be
treated as the experts: firm managers. Managers care intensely about whether their
entities will be tagged with criminal responsibility for wrongdoing.138 This worry
cannot just be about the cost of criminal monetary sanctions since the potential civil
damages in such cases almost always far outstrip them. 139 Managers and their counsel
apparently do not see civil and criminal sanctions as substitutes, and for good reason: it
has been reported, for example, that no major financial 4services institution in the
history of United States markets has survived indictment.1
No doubt managers have concluded that the constituents and audiences they are
compensated for reading correctly-consumers, purchasers and sellers of securities,
the media, government regulators, and so on-view the reputational impact of a
criminal prosecution as informationally very important.141 This must be because these

138. The question of whether prosecutors will enter the scene, or whether the firm's problem
will be limited to a garden-variety government regulatory matter, is among managers' main
worries when a crisis involving wrongdoing hits a firm. See Jennifer Arlen, Evolution of
Corporate Criminal Liability: Implications for Managers, in LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE
FROM THE INSIDE OUT 191 (Robert Gandossy & Jeffrey Sonnenfeld eds., 2004); Solomon &
Squeo, supra note 3, at Al ("Businesspeople and corporations are at greater risk of criminal
liability than ever before .... Faced with this environment, companies that might once have
resisted government investigations now scramble to cooperate. Corporate directors in particular
have grown leery of appearing to defend any sort of impropriety.").
139. Consider the following example. Suppose (this was not proved or charged) that
Citigroup's assistance to Enron in structuring misleading financial transactions was criminal.
The utmost the United States Sentencing Guidelines could have provided as a fine range in such
a criminal case would have been $145 million to $290 million. See U.S.S.G. MANUAL §§
8C2.4-8C2.6 (2004). In the absence of even an allegation of criminality and long before trial,
Citigroup settled civil charges for its conduct relating to Enron for $2 billion. See Julie
Creswell, Citigroup Agrees to Pay $2 Billion in Enron Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,2005, at

A 1. Some might speculate that management fear of criminal charges alternatively stems from the
potentially devastating preclusive effect of criminal findings in parallel civil litigation. But a
criminal indictment has no preclusive effect, and a criminal judgment must be obtained under a
much higher burden of proof (and often a more discriminating legal standard) than a civil
judgment. So in any case in which criminal charges are provable, civil liability is highly likely to
attach and be costly, regardless of whether criminal charges are filed or proven.
140. See Monica Langley & Ian McDonald, Marsh Averts Criminal Case with New CEO,
Oct. 26, 2004, at Al; Scannell, supra note 75, at A3 (stating that "a broader change

WALL ST. J.,

in attitude among corporations facing regulatory scrutiny, with many racing to cooperate by
turning over damaging information and jettisoning culpable employees").
141. See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRArrHWAirE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE
OFFENDERS 243 (1983) (arguing that non-financial impacts of scandals deterred managers from

future violations far more than financial penalties); Fisse, supra note 124, at 1153
("Corporations value their prestige so highly that they subsidize image-making as an extensive
light industry.").
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constituents and audiences ascribe real and distinct meaning to the entity criminal
sanction. 142
Evidence of this belief among managers appears in two established procedural
practices in entity criminal liability, both relating to privileges. First, the government
expects firms to require employees to cooperate in criminal investigations-that is, to
not assert their rights to silence in response to subpoenas and requests for interviews.
In order to obtain the benefits of cooperation with the government, principally
avoidance or mitigation of entity criminal sanctions, firms typically require such
employee cooperation on pain of employment consequence (usually firing).143 Second,
the government asks firms to waive their rights to shield relevant evidence with the
attorney-client and work-product privileges, particularly communications among
employees and firm lawyers contemporaneous with the conduct under investigation. 14 4
As with employee interviews, the government's leverage to obtain the waiver comes
from the firm's
interest in avoiding prosecution by maximizing credit for
14 5
cooperation.

The practice of entity criminal liability has unique and potent procedural
characteristics that encourage firms to disgorge (or even acquire and then disgorge)
evidence of criminality that the government might not otherwise obtain. 146 An

142. This form of argument is as old as the study of white-collar crime. See SUTHERLAND,
supra note 99, at 54-62 (arguing that the treatment of corporate wrongdoing, such as antitrust
violations, through civil rather than criminal legal process wrongly communicates to the public
that corporate offenders have not done wrongs deserving of stigma).
143. See, e.g., Robert A. Del Giomo, Corporate Counsel as Government's Agent: The
Holder Memorandum andSarbanes-Oxley Section 307, CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 22. Job loss is

a much more immediate sanction than imprisonment and therefore frequently will weigh heavily
in an employee's calculus. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 17, at 460 (arguing that
offenders discount punishments not likely to be imposed soon). Entity criminal liability thus
lessens truth-dampening effects of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
144. See Thompson Memo, supra note 60, at 7. The government seeks such waivers for two
reasons. The fruits of internal investigations which are almost always conducted by lawyers and
therefore otherwise inaccessible, can both speed up an investigation and lead it to evidence of
criminality that otherwise might go undiscovered. Additionally, the government needs to chart
the contemporaneous involvement of lawyers in the underlying activity under investigation. See,
e.g., United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that good faith

reliance on advice of counsel establishes defense to specific intent crimes).
145. See Thompson Memo, supra note 60, at 7.
146. See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good
Corporate Citizenship," 76 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 979, 994-95, 1014-15 (2002); William S.
Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading ofFavors,87 IowA L. REv. 643,
646-47 (2001) (arguing that "adjudicat[ion] by a brand of negotiated compliance" now prevails
in almost all cases of entity criminal liability). These practices are controversial. The obvious

attack, that they do violence to the attorney-client privilege, comes chiefly from the corporate
bar. See, e.g., David M. Zomow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink ofa Brave New World: The
Death ofPrivilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 147, 161 (2000)
(warning of "impending death" of attorney-client privilege); Lance Cole, Revoking Our
Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege
(and Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 542-48 (2003); Del Giomo, supra note 143, at

22; see also Laufer, supra, at 648-62 (arguing that practices may drive corporations to engage
in "reverse whistleblowing," that is, offer scapegoats to the government in exchange for non-
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instrumental regulatory program would tend to welcome these features of entity
criminal liability. Except for the balancing that arises when considering special values
guarded by privileges, the question is similar to that of sanctions generally: does
imposing costs on the f-rm enhance control of individual conduct?1 47 Compelling the
entity to disgorge evidence that otherwise would remain under shield increases the
probability that wrongdoing will be detected and punished.
These procedural mechanisms have deeper significance than their instrumental
rationales. They evidence the import of the social practice of entity blame. The
government's procedural leverage tracks the punitive bite of the sanction the firm faces
if it refuses to comply. Indeed, if criminal institutional blame were not actually
imposed in at least some cases, the leverage would disappear and we would expect
firms, at least some of the time, to refuse the government's requests for waivers and
evidence. 148 The opposite holds true. Firms routinely require employee cooperation
and grant the government its requested waiver. 149 Practitioners will attest that criminal
investigative demands (by subpoena or otherwise) elicit far prompter and more serious
compliance and that there is far less incentive in the civil context for a corporation to
compel its employees to cooperate and to waive privileges. By now it should be clear
why this is true. The social stigma of criminal entity blame can hurt firms badly and
they badly want to avoid it.1 50
There is at least one more place where we can see that criminal liability means more
for firms than just quantity of sanction. Settlement of a case in which entity criminal
liability might be imposed sometimes turns on whether a firm is willing to publicly
admit responsibility for the criminal conduct of its agents. Andersen failed to settle, in
spite of non-prosecution proposals discussed both before and after indictment, largely
because Andersen was unwilling to make such a statement, while the government
insisted that it do so. 151 KPMG, in contrast, achieved settlement only with
prosecution of entity, even when it may turn out that entity is more culpable); cf Schoeman,
supra note 97, at 312 ("[Ilf quasi-authoritative social forces have significantly contributed to
wrongdoing by themselves falling below a moral threshold, then these authoritative forces lack
the standing to blame others for misdeeds attributable to this failing.").
147. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 695-97 (arguing that state properly views
corporate form as a surrogate to be "harnessed" in "service of optimal deterrence"); id at 754
("[T]he purpose of corporate sanctions is not to punish wrongdoers but rather to induce firms to
detect, report, and punish wrongdoers."); FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 94, at 15.
148. See FEINBERG, supranote 133, at 104 ("A statute honored mainly in the breach begins
to lose its character as law, unless, as we say, it is vindicated (emphatically reaffirmed); and
clearly the way to do this (indeed the only way) is to punish those who violate it.") (emphasis in
original).
149. See, e.g., Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 146, at 153-58; ABA Assails Sentencing
Guideline Comment on Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege,74 U.S.L. WK. 2119,2120 (2005)
(reporting that, according to the ABA, firms waive privilege claims for fear of being seen as
uncooperative, which can have "profound effect on their public image, stock price, and
creditworthiness" (quoting Letter from Robert D. Evans, Governmental Affairs Director,
A.B.A., to U.S. Sentencing Commission (Aug. 15, 2005))).
150. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
EnvironmentalLaw: Reforming Environmental CriminalLaw, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407,2442 (1995);
Fisse, supra note 124, at 1220.
151. Some might wonder whether Andersen refused to admit responsibility because it did not
think anyone committed a crime. But in pretrial negotiations the firm did not seriously dispute
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unambiguous admissions52that its abusive tax shelters were fraudulent and that the fraud
was caused by the firm.1
If a firm settles a case with a clear admission of wrongdoing, some beneficial
message effects are accomplished from the government's point of view, while the firm
dampens reputational damage by portraying itself as accepting responsibility, which is
essential to the credibility of commitments to reform. Thus there seems to be a coin to
the message and reputational effects of entity criminal liability that is partially
susceptible to compromise and that enforcers and managers recognize as potent and
valuable.153

The evidence of reputational effects in management behavior should not be
surprising. If institutional blame is a social practice, and imposition of blame inflicts
costs, then rational firm managers will seek to avoid blame, whether or not it seems
rational to them that the entity pay a reputational penalty for a judgment of criminal
fault that results from individual misconduct. The more serious and authoritative the
blame, the more reputationally costly it is likely to be to the firm, and the more
will be the strongest
managers will strive to avoid its imposition. Criminal legal blame
15 4
form of institutional blame, to be resisted most strenuously.

the government's and most lower federal courts' interpretation of then-existing federal law: that
an auditor who suddenly destroys documents relating to a client upon learning of an SEC
investigation of that client obstructs justice.
152. See, e.g., KPMG Settlement, supra note 76.
153. A problem for future study is how the civil liability system can inhibit beneficial
settlements over reputation. By policy, for example, the SEC permits firms to settle allegations
of securities fraud while neither admitting nor denying the allegations' truth. The policy is

designed to overcome barriers to settlement created by the preclusive effects that a firm's
admission can have in parallel private litigation. See, e.g., Jeff Bailey & Lynnley Browning,
KPMGMay Dodge One Bullet, Only to FaceAnother, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at C I (noting
that an audit firm's public acceptance of responsibility for "unlawful conduct" by partners,
meant to persuade government to refrain from prosecution, could greatly heighten its
vulnerability to costly civil claims). But a policy excusing firms from admission undermines the
normative significance of SEC settlements, creating a perhaps perverse incentive for the
government to select criminal prosecution over SEC enforcement proceedings. This dynamic
can inhibit settlement in cases of criminal entity liability, and probably inhibited settlement in
Andersen. One question worth investigating might be whether collateral estoppel rules could be

modified to reduce disincentives for firms to admit complicity in an agent's criminal act.
154. Andersen is perhaps an extreme case, but it nonetheless stands as proof of this

proposition, in light of both the firm's reaction to the prospects of prosecution and the results of
prosecution. How and why Andersen had strong communicative force is harder to isolate.
Andersen's position as a leading fiduciary probably exerted considerable force. See Lynch,
supranote 11, at 52 (arguing that corporate punishment is only likely to be effective where the

corporation is big and stable enough to be affected by blame); Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan
R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An EmpiricalExamination of Major Accounting
Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPHiICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 266 (2004) ("Auditors'
reputations are central to the standard economic theory of auditing."). For organizations like
Andersen that are reputationally sensitive, the plunge caused by imposition of criminal liability
can be swift and deep. Cf. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations
Become Criminals?Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost,5 J. CORP. FIN.

1, 28 (1999) (finding that reputational harm to publicly traded firms from crime was greater for
firms that had lower pre-crime probability of crime).
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b. Inconclusive Studies
Some evidence has been described as leaning in the contrary direction, that is,
suggesting not that reputational effects do not exist but that legal process does not
influence them. If this were clearly true, there might be reason to doubt whether
imposition of criminal entity liability has any real effect beyond monetary sanctions
that could be imposed equally through other means. But the limited evidence is
inconclusive. And the argument that law does not matter to reputational effects should
be approached skeptically, for the same reason that society has long sought to impose
institutional blame through legal process. The legal practice matters to those who
pursue it and to those pursued by it.
Using a sample of 132 cases among seventy-one public firms, the perhaps leading
empirical study found that reputational effects from allegation and proof of fraud,
measured solely by loss in firms' equity values, are substantial, averaging 1.34% in the
period following first disclosure of fraud. 155 However, this study then calculated that
market-imposed reputational sanctions, representing 93.5% of the total loss to firms
from incidents of fraud disclosure, hugely overshadow legal sanctions. It therefore
argued that legal
sanctions should be greatly discounted for the market effects of fraud
56
disclosure.'
There are three principal problems with these assertions, and for any claim that they
have implications for analysis of entity criminal liability. First and most obvious,
treating immediate decline in a firm's equity value as the only measure of reputational
effect is a severely limiting step. Second, the study's data supporting the comparison
between market and legal sanctions is of questionable import. The study was able to
analyze only fifteen of its 132 cases in comparing legal and reputational sanctions, and
ten of those fifteen cases involved allegations of government contracting fraud; only
four of the fifteen cases involved fraud on stakeholders, and in three of those four no
criminal fine was imposed.157 One would expect cases of government contracting fraud
to involve much higher potential market sanctions because of fear that a firm could be
temporarily or permanently ejected from its bilateral monopoly relationship with the
government. In any event, the number of cases is so small, and their characteristics
sufficiently atypical, as to leave doubt about conclusions drawn from the data.
Third and probably most significant, the study did not measure (and the authors did
not address) whether any of the reputational decline in firm value should have been
ascribed to some aspect of the legal proceedings-the fact of a firm's criminal
conviction, publicity about a legal judgment of wrongdoing, the facts that supported
such a judgment, and so on-that did not involve just the predicted monetary sanctions
or the actual court-imposed sanctions. That is, the authors assumed that the only thing

155. See Jonathan M. Karpoff& John R. Lott, Jr., The ReputationalPenalty Firms Bear
from Committing CriminalFraud,36 J. L. & EcoN. 757, 759, 773-80 (1993).
156. See id. at 780-84.

157. See id.at 783. Apparently, only fifteen of the 132 cases were susceptible to the authors'
comparison of reputational and legal sanctions because only fifteen cases involved a first public
announcement of fraud that included information about legal proceedings. The authors were
attempting to compare the effects of the prospect of legal sanctions with overall market
sanctions. That is, they assumed that the reputational penalty equated to all market decline
beyond the predicted amount of legal penalties. Id. at 782.
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that interests observers about a legal proceeding is what it will cost a firm in sanctions
and that anything observers conclude about a firm in terms of willingness to deal with
it in the future (i.e., about its reputation) is solely the product of learning the fact that
fraud occurred, whether or not anybody brought a case over it.' 5 8 As this Article has
argued, there is good reason to think that legal proceedings can have much stronger
informational significance; certainly, the contrary cannot be assumed in analysis of the
relationship between the legal process and reputational sanctions.159
Subsequent studies have not clarified the dependency of reputational effects on the
legal process. Another study again found that market-imposed sanctions resulting from
disclosure of wrongdoing were substantial (an average decline in equity value of 2.26%
in the period following disclosure of wrongdoing in a sample of sixty firms) and that
market sanctions were much greater in cases of crimes by firms against related parties
than crimes against third parties.16 This is not surprising. It shows that observers will
weigh the nature of a firm's wrongdoing in determining reputation. This study further
found a strong relationship between market sanctions, in the form of equity decline,
and information about termination of firms' customer relationships.' 6' Again, no
surprise here. We would expect that a firm's value would decline most when
wrongdoing62 drives away customers, because such flight conveys that a firm is
unreliable.1

Another study reaffirmed the significance of reputational effects and their variation
with the nature of the wrongdoing. 63 This study then attempted to isolate effects of
criminal legal proceedings by comparing the magnitude of equity declines following

158. Cf FISSE & BRArrHWArrE, supra note 141, at 231-32 (finding in qualitative study of
seventeen cases of corporate wrongdoing that adverse publicity reduced earnings in four cases,
reduced stock value in seven cases, and damaged image in fifteen cases).
159. There's at least a third problem with the study. It's somewhat odd to treat all
reputational effects as a form of sanction to be equated with legal sanctions, that is, as part ofthe
damages assessed for wrongdoing. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 155, at 757. If buyers
stopped purchasing from a vendor firm because information spread that the firm had begun to
deliver a time-sensitive product (say live lobsters) slowly, but no lawsuit were filed (or even
colorable), we wouldn't think of the firm as having paid "damages" for its tardy conduct.
Reputational effects from legal wrongdoing should be separated from reputational effects from
all available information about a firm. Failing to make this distinction may preordain a
surprising conclusion, like the one reached by Karpoff and Lott's study, that markets all by
themselves nearly optimally sanction firms.
160. See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penaltyfor Corporate

Crime: Evidence, 42 J. L. &ECON. 489,504-22 (1999) (finding equity decline in 88% of cases
of related-party harm but only 50% of cases of third-party harm).
161. See id.

162. The study also found that the typical victim of related-party wrongdoing in a federal
criminal case against a firm is the government, not one or more private parties. See id.at 523.
The author suggests for future study the question of whether such non-atomistic customers
discount the amount of market-based penalties they impose by the amount of expected courtimposed penalties. Id.
163. See Michael K. Block, OptimalPenalties,CriminalLaw and the Controlof Corporate

Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 410-15 (1991) (repeating the analysis of Karpoff and Lott's
study, using data from an additional twenty-three cases; finding average decline in equity value
of 2.23% in all cases of fraud but only 0.32% decline in cases of malum prohibitum offenses).
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first fraud announcements to the magnitude of equity declines in a sample often cases
of civil fines assessed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for airline safety
violations.'64 It found the magnitude of equity decline comparable in both samples and
therefore concluded that "criminal actions against corporations provide no unique
informational benefits to corporate stakeholders.' 65
The claim that the reputational effects of government findings of airline safety
violations in a sample of ten FAA regulatory actions is a reliable stand-in for the
informational significance of all non-criminal forms of action seems doubtful. 166 The
sample is extremely small and somewhat peculiar. FAA violations, possibly conveying
information about an airline's susceptibility to a catastrophic accident, might be
substantially more reputationally significant than the average non-criminal legal result.
3. Variables in Reputational Effect
Three things can be said with some confidence about reputational effects: they are
real, they are complicated, and their complexity comes in part from their relationship to
the legal process. In the absence of more textured empirical work (assuming it were
feasible), we cannot quantify the relationship between the legal process and
reputational effects. We can, however, describe variables likely to influence
reputational effects.
The empirical studies discussed above establish that reputational effects begin to
attach before legal proceedings, supporting the intuition that such effects are contextdependent. Observers will look at the facts of a case of wrongdoing in determining
what to conclude about the reliability of a firm. The nature of the wrongdoing, the
degree to which the wrongdoing is attributable to the firm, the nature of the victim, the
nature and size of the firm, 167 the firm's products and industry, and the ex ante
reputation68of the firm all should affect the conclusions of a hypothetically careful
observer. 1

However, the legal process also will play an important role in shaping the
conclusions of observers, in two respects. First, legal process, and especially criminal
legal process, will tend to generate publicity that will increase both the depth of

164. See id. at 414-15.
165. Id. at415.
166. See Alexander, supranote 160, at 523 (arguing that research treats market penalties as
independent of court-imposed sanctions but should examine whether they are jointly
determined). There may be a mistaken assumption in an analysis like Block's: if theform of
legal process matters to reputational sanctions, the view holds, we should find that all criminal
cases have the same reputational effect. This view omits consideration of whether the existence
of criminal charges and the nature of the charges are interactive. One could hypothesize a
hierarchy of reputational effects, rising, for example, from toxic dumping with no legal action,
to toxic dumping with regulatory action, to toxic dumping with criminal action, to fraud with no
legal action, to fraud with civil action, to fraud with criminal action.
167. See Macey, supranote 110, at 323 (arguing that crime will tend to be more prevalent in
smaller firms where managers can capture a larger share of the profits of crime, offsetting risk to
managers of potential punishment for crime).
168. See Kadish, supra note 128, at 434 (arguing that deterrent effects of entity criminal
liability will vary according to firm size, its market position, and the extent of public notice,
among other factors).
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observers' knowledge about an instance of wrongdoing and the number of observers
with knowledge of the wrongdoing. Litigation tends to be public and to reveal facts. Of
course, publicity depends on the nature of the wrongdoing, so the influence of these
factors (and others) will be interrelated, and perhaps inextricable.
Second, legal process, and especially criminal legal process, is likely to
communicate with a force of authority that will boost reputational effects among all
observers, but particularly among less careful observers. A recent empirical study of
industry reaction to instances of wrongdoing by firms found that the less careful
observer-not the one who studies the facts of each case-is actually the typical
observer and, for the less careful observer, the existence and severity of enforcement
action are far more influential than the contours of a particular case. 169 In a noisy world
in which costs of full information are prohibitive for most actors, the legal process
enjoys a monopoly on a particularly influential form of communication that, in the
context of entity criminal liability, can convey important information about the
reputation of firms.
Other factors, beyond the facts of the wrongdoing and the presence or absence of
legal action, will further affect reputational sanctions. Management and employees'
sensitivity to reputational impact at the firm level will determine in part how influential
reputational sanctions are in deterring wrongdoing and altering institutional
arrangements to make subsequent wrongdoing less likely. Effects will be much
stronger in some settings (for example, among partners in an auditing firm that abets
publication of fraudulent financial statements) than in others (for example, among
drivers in a waste-hauling firm that discharges chemicals from its trucks as they pass
along the highways).1 70
As developed fully in Part III, the contours of the legal rule will affect the influence
of legal process on reputational effects. If firm liability is imposed, as under respondeat
superior, without regard to the degree of the firm's involvement in the agent's offense,
a judgment against the firm will mean less to observers than under a legal system that
requires a finding of firm responsibility before imposition of judgment. In the latter

169. See Neil A. Cunningham, Dorothy Thornton, & Robert Kagan, Motivating
Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection, 27 LAW & POL'Y 289
(2005); Dorothy Thornton, Neil A. Cunningham, & Robert A. Kagan, GeneralDeterrenceand
CorporateEnvironmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL'Y 262 (2005); J.L. Short & Michael W.
Toffel, Turning Themselves In: Why Companies Disclose Regulatory Violations 25-29 (July
13, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfin?abstract_id=776586 (examining data about firms that self-report under programs
encouraging disclosure of environmental violations, and finding that firms that previously
experienced enforcement actions were more likely to self-report violations, as were large firms,
presumably because large firms are more sensitive to reputational effects).
170. A recent commentary observed that there might be some perversity in reputational
sanctions. The firms most likely to spawn criminality will tend to have bad ex ante reputations
and therefore will be less affected by stigma, while the most responsible firms will suffer the
most from criminal prosecution. See Beale & Safwat, supra note 13, at 100. True enough, but
reputationally sensitive firms (and the people who work there) may be at the margin where the
criminal law can hope to accomplish the most deterrence. In addition, it often will not be
pointless to stigmatize firms with low ex ante reputations. Even tobacco companies ultimately
changed their behaviors in response to a drumbeat of charges of harmful and deceptive
manufacturing and marketing of cigarettes.
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context, observers are likely to treat a legal judgment as a more influential predictor of
a firm's tendency to produce wrongdoing in the future. In turn, management is likely to
have greater fear of the effects of a legal judgment under such a system, and thus will
make greater efforts to arrange the firm's affairs so as to ensure that the firm does not
generate instances of agent wrongdoing.
E. Civil Substitution

Notwithstanding the proof of reputational effects, the inconclusiveness of the
evidence on the relationship between those effects and legal process, and the good
reasons to think legal process is influential in driving reputational sanctions, the
argument has been advanced that criminalenterprise liability has virtually no features
that a system of civil enterprise liability could not replicate.17 1 In this view, advanced
chiefly by Vikramaditya Khanna, reputational sanctions are both inefficient and of
questionable influence. 7 2 Criminal sanctions against entities, the argument goes,
chiefly include fines, probation, debarment, loss of license, and reputational harm.
Fines are the most efficient of these because they are the cheapest to administer.
Estimating the liquidated value of the other sanctions, especially loss of license and
reputational harm, is costly and, because difficult and uncertain, carries heightened risk
of producing over- or under-deterrence. Non-fine sanctions thus are preferable, the
argument concludes, only when the entity is insolvent in relation to the optimal
sanction. However, this view holds, even then we must account for a social cost ofnon-

171. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 10, at 319; Khanna, supra note 5, at 1534. This
position's theoretical framework dates at least to the Model Penal Code. The Code, while
adopting a form of entity criminal liability, described the problem in terms of the utility of fining
firms, a "primary purpose" of which is "to encourage diligent supervision of corporate personnel
by managerial employees." See AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 2.07 cmt. 6 (1985). It is settled that enterprise liability is a desirable means of
reducing individual wrongdoing. Traditional arguments approved its risk-spreading efficiency
and fairness. CompareYoung B. Smith, FrolicandDetour,23 COLUM. L. REv. 444,456 (1923)
(risk spreading), and Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 544-45 (1961) (same), with Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United

States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) ("[A] business enterprise cannot justly
disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its
activities."). More recent analysis has found entity liability necessary to correct suboptimal
effects of personal liability as a deterrent where, as is common, the agent is insolvent in relation
to the cost of her delict. See FEIBERG, supra note 133, at 229; Jennifer Arlen, CorporateCrime
and Its Control, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTiONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 492, 493
(Peter Newman ed., 1998); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An EconomicAnalysis of the ChoiceBetween
EnterpriseandPersonalLiabilityforAccidents,70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1365-66 (1982); Reinier
H. Kraakman, CorporateLiabilityStrategiesand the Costs ofLegal Controls,93 YALE L.J. 857,
858-76 (1984); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability,93 YALE L.J. 1231, 123359 (1984). However, there remains doubt about the optimal shape of enterprise liability. See,
e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 735-41; Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod,
Beyond Master-Servant:A Critiqueof VicariousLiability, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 111 (Stuart
Madden ed., 2005).
172. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 1494-1512; Fischel & Sykes, supra note 10, at 319.
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fine sanctions. Nobody receives the value of the entity's lost reputation or license,
which sunk resources produced.
The argument concedes only a very limited role for reputational sanctions. Because
they apply early, often without regard to legal results at and after trial, and thus carry
higher expected sanction, they might be desirable in a narrow group of cases in which
either a very high expected sanction is needed that exceeds all other available
sanctions, or the costs of litigation would exceed the additional costs that reputational
sanctions carry over fines. And, the argument points out, this tool may not be available
(because it will have no bite) with institutions with low ex ante reputations or with
forms of wrongdoing that do not matter to observers.
Even if reputational sanctions are sometimes desirable, the argument continues,
non-criminal means can impose them. This contention proceeds from the intuition that
"it is hard to believe that consumers would ascribe stigma to a corporation solely on
the basis of the category of legal proceeding in which it was involved."' 73 The
argument concludes that reputational sanctions will have import only in cases involving
"grandiose" harm, in which monetary sanctions are inadequate, and in grandiose cases
we should expect reputational penalties to be the same regardless of whether legal
action is civil or criminal. 174 Criminal entity liability therefore is instrumentally
75
indistinguishable from civil liability and is a less preferable means of imposing costs.'
This argument has several drawbacks. As we have seen, it is extremely difficult
(maybe impossible) to account for reputational sanctions in a framework that seeks to
determine sanction optimality.176 We cannot forecast ex ante, or even measure ex post,
the total effects of a criminal charge and conviction on the willingness of consumers,
actual and prospective employees, vendors, customers, investors, lenders, donors,
volunteers, beneficiaries, and others to deal with the entity. Further, the government
cannot dial up a reputational penalty, even one that is less than precise, by
manipulating the legal charge or the level of fine. Too many factors influence
reputational effects.
Criminal entity liability may not allow for calibration of sanctions, forcing the legal
system into a binary choice between imposing reputational sanctions (or at least that
portion that flows from the legal process) or not imposing them. Richard Bierschbach
and Alex Stein point out that attempting to offset reputational sanctions could require
setting legal sanctions for firms at zero, which might drain meaning and influence from
the legal process. 77 In their terms, some degree of"overenforcement," that is, total ex

173. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1508; Arlen, supra note 171, at 496; David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811, 1831-32 (2001).
174. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1509.
175. See Brown, supra note 108, at 1317-18 (arguing that monitoring-incentive rationale for
entity criminal liability is weak because it could be satisfied with civil liability alone); Fischel &
Sykes, supranote 10, at 319 (arguing that the case for corporate criminal liability must rest on
the need to correct some deficiency in the system of civil liability and that "corporate criminal
liability in practice produces serious problems of overdeterrence"); Fisse, supra note 124, at
1142 n.2, 1144-45 (discussing how some commentators urge replacing corporate criminal
sanctions with civil penalties).
176. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743 (2005).
177. See id.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:473

post sanctioning effects from enforcement
that exceed the level of ex ante sanction
8
optimal for deterrence, is unavoidable.
At the same time, it is the remoteness of reputational sanctions from legal controltheir socially determined nature-that makes them a potent influence on behavior.
Because of the social meaning in criminal sanctions, non-criminal penalties cannot act
as substitutes, and entities must internalize some portion of the criminal sanction.
Reputational harm, unlike monetary sanctions,
generally cannot be indemnified,
179
insured, or otherwise passed through to others.
Khanna, for one, has to make two problematic moves in his case against the utility
of reputational sanctions. First, he assumes that reputational effects on firms can be
quantified in monetary terms, so that fines can be a substitute, and the two forms of
sanction can have the same effects in pricing firms' failures to prevent wrongdoing.
Second, and more problematic, he assumes the same thing about reputational effects on
people, that is, that other sanctions including civil liability can substitute (while
simultaneously doubting whether reputational "rub-off' occurs). 80 Only stylized
rational choice models of corporate actors and consumers allow for these assumptions.
Neither assumption is likely to hold up under thickened behavioral analysis, much less
against evidence of how corporate managers and consumers have tended to behave,
and react to criminal sanctions, in actual cases.
Whether reputational sanctions are categorically inefficient depends on how
inefficiency of sanctions is measured. If the efficient sanction is the sanction that
induces socially optimal behavior, and we can determine and quantify that sanction ex
ante, then reputational sanctions threaten efficiency because they are untamable. But
what if we cannot fully determine ex ante, as an empirical matter, the quantity of
sanction that will succeed in deterring misconduct in firms or, indeed, the amount of
misconduct in firms that is acceptable because further deterrence would be too costly?
Then we might want to adopt a more decentralized regulatory approach, relying on
social assessment of the seriousness and costs of wrongdoing in firms.' 81 From this
perspective, reputational sanctions might be efficient not just because they are
powerful and we might need powerful sanctions to deter, but also because they are
controlled by the social response to the enforcement action. The problem of lack of
control over reputational sanctions thus points to a balance of considerations, not to a
82
conclusion that potential for inefficiency requires rejection of the sanction.1
Moreover, Khanna's claim that civil regimes can perfectly substitute for a criminal
regime runs into the empirical problem discussed in Part II.D.2. Rehashing that

178. See id.; Coffee, supra note 10, at 427 (arguing that negative publicity about
corporations is "a loose cannon" that cannot be calibrated).
179. See FISSE & BRArnwArrE, supra note 94, at 8; Kraakman, supra note 171, at 893
(arguing that reputation, an element of "firn-specific capital," is among professional firms' most
valuable assets, is uninsurable, and cannot be protected by diversifying clientele); Lederman,
supra note 8, at 312-13.
180. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 1500-12.
181. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1533 (1984)
(arguing that when officials lack information about costs of behavior, it can be efficient to rely
on a community standard that represents consensus about socially optimal behavior).
182. Moreover, as noted previously, reputational sanctions may be partially susceptible to
compromise. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53.
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material is unnecessary. Reputational sanctions are real and their contingency on the
legal process, especially the criminal legal process, is complicated, likely to be
substantial, and certainly not disproved.
In addition, there is inconsistency in Khanna's treatment of reputational sanctions.
On one hand, his argument nods to their power, contending that such sanctions should
be reserved only for cases in which a really big sanction is needed (one that might
exceed a firm's entire asset pool) and conceding that such sanctions will tend to flow
quickly in cases of "grandiose" wrongdoing, without regard to legal process.183 On the
other hand, the argument dismisses the reputational sanction that comes from the
criminal process, going so far as to contend that the legal system can send messages as
effectively through means such as "news conferences, corporate civil liability, and
managerial' 184
criminal liability" or "a well publicized letter condemning the corporation's

activities.

This inconsistency probably reveals futility in fitting the social meaning of entity
criminal liability into quantitative modeling. Indeed, the end point for the argument
that criminality should not matter in the entity context is the view that if people just
understood the problem properly, they would conclude that they had been mistaken,
stop caring, and divest entity criminal liability of its meaning. In other words, the
continued bite of the entity criminal sanction is a failure in informational markets,
correction of which should cause the significance of entity criminal liability to leak
away without regard to law reform. It might seem absurd or unfair to attribute this view
to anyone, but the argument essentially has been made.' 85 The claim has not been borne
out under even a faultless respondeat superior regime, and it would be even less
plausible under a more fault-based regime like the one described in Part III.
A final aspect of the argument that civil entity liability can replicate criminal
liability, again advanced by Khanna, merits brief comment because it further
demonstrates how claims that criminal entity liability may be pointless tend to assume
away social facts. Khanna has contended that criminal procedure is probably
unnecessary in legal action against entities because worries that lead to special
protections for individuals, chiefly the high costs of error, do not apply to firms. 86

183. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1509.
184. Id. at 1532. But see Coffee, supra note 10, at 425-29 (arguing that difficulties with
publicity strategy are that government is a poor propagandist, criticism of corporations already
"inundates" channels of communication, corporations engage in counter-publicity, and publicity
may not matter in cases of regulatory violations); Langevoort, supra note 114, at 102
(discussing how firms can make reputational effects ambiguous by settling while denying,
scape-goating offenders, and blaming greedy civil plaintiffs for legal actions).
185. See Fischel & Sykes, supranote 10, at 332 (arguing that crime in entities is "perfectly
appropriate if the costs of additional monitoring would exceed the benefits" and "[flailure to
monitor in the abstract should no more result in reputation loss ... than failure to build an
accident-proof automobile").
186. See Khanna, supra note 5, at 1513-16; Khanna, Corporate Defendants, supranote 10,
at 15; Fischel & Sykes, supranote 10, at 331-32. One might have expected Khanna to hold that
the claimed high social cost of reputational penalty justifies more procedural protection in a
criminal proceeding. See Coffee, supranote 10, at 403 ("[T]he accused corporation often cannot
afford the time interval necessary to establish its innocence."). Instead, though, he maintains that
trial-related procedure may be irrelevant because most reputational loss occurs following the
first announcement of wrongdoing. Khanna further argues that since defendants have more to
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Meanwhile, from the perspective of order maintenance, his argument goes, the
government does not need the special investigative powers that operate in criminal
cases such as those of the grand jury. Granting "virtually identical" civil investigative
powers to regulatory bodies, such as the SEC's powers to subpoena documents and
take testimony, would replicate such powers. 8 7 The sole procedural advantage to
by maintaining a single proceeding
criminal enforcement, he says, is that it saves costs
88
prosecuted.1
are
also
agents
which
in
cases
in
This argument eliminates the significance of criminal procedure by fiat. The more
the criminal proceeding is stripped of its special procedural characteristics, the less
meaning the reputational sanction will carry. As we will see in discussing the shape of
the legal rule for entity criminal liability in Part III, the scope of liability is likely to
influence reputational sanction. Khanna gets it backwards when he argues that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury, as well as other defendant-protective rights,
can be discarded in the corporate context once we agree that the costs of erroneous
conviction are less because liberty is not at stake. The inquiry should begin with what
comprises a criminal conviction. A major ingredient is that the proof unanimously
satisfied a jury of twelve impartial citizens beyond a reasonable doubt.' 89 Surely this
fact, and the impact it has on the lesson people take from observing a criminal legal
result, explain in part why a criminal conviction can have particularly strong
reputational effects.190
F. Retribution and Expression
Retribution and expression warrant a brief detour here because of the importance of
those concepts to any analysis of criminal law.

lose than plaintiffs in civil proceedings (in the form of reputations), they will make up for the
lower burden of proof by investing more in contesting the cases. See Khanna, Corporate
Defendants, supra note 10, at 22-24. Yet he surprisingly concludes that we should consider
stronger procedural protections for civil cases, where risk of improper government enforcement
is said to be greater due to frequency of actions, often higher penalties, prevalence of lobbying,
and higher risk of capture. See id. at 39-41.
187. See Khanna,supranote 5, at 1519-24.
188. See id. at 1529-30; Coffee, supra note 10, at 448 (arguing that restricting penalizing of
corporations to civil remedies would underutilize the "decentralized infrastructure of public
enforcers" in prosecutors' offices across country). However, Khanna's argument reminds us that
we must trade off these savings against the higher sanctioning costs of criminal reputational
penalties. (Recall the point that no one receives the value of lost reputation.) See Khanna,supra
note 5, at 1530. This may be inconsistent with his argument that reputational sanctions should
not differ between civil and criminal contexts.
189. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("It is critical that the moral force of the
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
men are being condemned.").
190. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 856-57. Khanna's argument about procedure also
misses the fact that criminal entity liability confers special power on the government that may
further instrumental objectives of detecting and deterring wrongdoing within firms. See supra
text accompanying notes 144-5 1.
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1. Just Deserts
Application of retributive theory to entity criminal liability tends to lead in opposite
directions. Traditional critics of the doctrine complained about its theoretical impurity.
Entity liability does not belong in the criminal law, they said, because a corporation has
"no soul to be damned, no body to be kicked."' 19 Such critiques made up ground lost
when courts originally adopted entity criminal liability without thoughtful analysis. By
worrying whether damning institutions makes any sense, they suggested the need to
justify a particular blaming practice.
But the position of these critics made an argument that was really an assumption.
Why should we start with the settled conception of individual criminal responsibility,
however well-seasoned, in determining the limits of criminal law's place in society?
Social norms and practices would seem to be the right place to start in understanding
the possible function of a criminal law rule, even if we were interested only in
explaining and justifying a retributive device. We might end up choosing not to
approve of those social practices, for reasons that might correspond to theories of
individual responsibility. First, however, we would
need to examine the reasons people
92
do assign criminal blame to inanimate bodies.'
As Peter Cane explains, corporations cannot "act" any more than they can
"think."' 9' If the objection to applying criminal liability to entities is that they lack
culpable minds, then the same objection should apply to their lack of any body that can
commit an act. If that objection held, then all entity liability, not just criminal entity
liability, would be objectionable. Therefore, entity responsibility can only be explained
with reference to social practices-specifically how we choose to balance the interests
of a group in freedom of group action with the interests of others whom responsibility
practices seek to protect-not through antiseptic inquiry into the true "nature" of
entities.' 94

191. Lederman, supra note 8, at 309 (quoting R. CROSS & P. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO
122 (10th ed. R. Card ed. 1984) (quoting remark of the second Baron Thurlow));
see also Alschuler, supranote 8, at 313 (arguing that "ordinary principles of culpability do not
fit" the problem of institutional crime, and the practice of blaming institutions makes no more
sense than the medieval practice of"deodand" in which retribution fell on swords or wheels for
their roles in harmful events); Lederman, supra note 8, at 296 ("The theory which views the
corporation as subject to criminal liability challenges.., the ideological and normative basis of
the criminal law and its mode of expression and operation."); Manuel G. Velasquez, Why
CRiMmNAL LAW

Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, in COLLECTIVE

111, 117 (Larry
May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (arguing that actus reus and mens rea "are at the heart of
philosophical and legal notions of responsibility").
192. See FISSE &BRAITHWAITE, supranote 94, at 24 ("[T]he issue is 'more a matter of what
we consider moral responsibility to be, rather than what sort of metaphysical entities
RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICALANDAPPLIED ETHICs

corporations may turn out to be'.")(quoting J. Surber, Individualand CorporateResponsibility:
Two AlternativeApproaches, 2 Bus. & PROF'L ETHICS J. 67, 81 (1983)); Fisse, supranote 124,

at 1149 ("When people blame corporations, they are not merely channeling aggression against a
deodand or some other symbolic object; they are condemning the fact that people within the
organization collectively failed to avoid the offense to which corporate blame attaches.").
193. CANE, supra note 88, at 162-63.
194. Cane concludes, "[The practice of attributing responsibility to abstract entities seems
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In framing the wrong question, the retributivist critique has misled defenders of
entity criminal liability into misguided and futile efforts to shoehorn entity liability into
the criminal law with inapt metaphors and anthropomorphic analogies.' 95 The
persistence of respondeat superior as the dominant rule of liability has only encouraged
since it so sharply deviates from principles of individual criminal
these mistakes
96
culpability.1
Alright, one might say, then let us embrace the social meaning of entity blame and
follow it to the opposite result: entity liability belongs in the criminal law because
entities are blameworthy, full stop. There is no need to consider the utility of the
practice, the argument might go, because it fully accords with retribution as a justifying
aim, whether or not metaphysics can determine if a legal entity is a proper object of
retribution.
Aspects of existing expressive accounts of entity criminal liability appear to sound
in this view. For example, it has been argued that punishing entities, regardless of the
utility in harnessing the firm to control the conduct of people, repudiates the "false
valuations" that corporate crimes express by sending the message that "people matter
more than profits."' 197 Perhaps people want to engage in retribution against an entity for
an agent crime, even when an entity does not influence the agent, simply because ofthe
presence of the entity in the particular matter or the general ubiquity of entities in
social harm.
Somewhat surprisingly, expressive theorists have not yet considered the legitimacy
of such a legal practice of entity blame. 198 If we are interested in what should and
should not be in the law (the discussion of entity criminal liability long has been, if
nothing else, such an inquiry), we ought to consider whether repudiation of
organizations belongs there and, if so, what rules would tend to confine the practice to
the right cases.199 If the objective in expressing criminal blame against entities is
so deeply entrenched in social discourse that it is hard to understand why many philosophers
cling so strongly to the traditional humanistic approach." Id. at 164.
195. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 448 ("The study of corporate criminal responsibility too
long has been led astray by commentators seeking to fashion retributive justifications and
anthropomorphic analogies.").
196. See Lynch, supra note 11, at 39 ("When corporations are held liable for the acts of
relatively low-level managers, even acting in violation of express corporate policy, it becomes
difficult to sustain the idea that 'the corporation' as an entity is blameworthy in any way that is
easily analogized to the intentional actions of a natural person.").
197. Kahan, supra note 11, at 618-19; see also Anderson & Pildes, supra note 89, at 151314; Friedman, supra note 11, at 843. For detailed defenses of expressive theory and its
application to criminal law, see, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. RFV. 349, 362 (1997) ("Economists speak of criminal law as a
mechanism for pricing misconduct, but ordinary citizens think of it as a convention for morally
condemning it."); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2021, 2024 (1996) (describing the expressive function as "making statements" rather than
"controlling behavior directly").
198. Cf THuumAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 147 (Harcourt, Brace &
World 1962) (1935) ("[T]he only function which the criminal trial can perform is to express
currently held ideals about crime and about trials.").
199. See O'Sullivan, supra note 59, at 18 ("[I]f vicarious firm liability will not serve the
purposes of incapacitation, deterrence or rehabilitation... the fact that it facilitates sanctioning
should be troubling rather than reassuring.").
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loyalty to "just deserts"-a view that legal expression should express correct norms,
and entity criminal liability expresses a correct norm-such a view requires an account
of blameworthiness. 200 Only an entity wrong would call for a response directed at the
entity.

Expressive theory has not yet articulated a standard for when norms impel us to
criminally blame an entity, that is, it has not explained its own charter. To say that
entities should be criminally condemned when people feel that individuals "were
sacrificed to 'corporate greed' 20 1 does not state a principle with standing to support a
regime of law.2° It does not answer even the simple question posed by the
traditionalist critique-that is, whether entity criminal liability is just irrational
flogging.
2. Utility
Because expressive accounts have focused on the popular taste for entity criminal
liability and have not sought the true nature of entity responsibility, they presumably
are not about retributivism in the strict sense. 3 As it turns out, expressive theorists
have sought to build a bridge from blameworthiness to utility. They have asserted that
the imposition of entity criminal liability expresses important values even if it cannot
inflict sanctions that differ materially from civil penalties. By satisfying public demand
for condemnation and retribution, the law creates public welfare to replace the lost
value of the corporation's reputation. 204 Moreover, it expresses a degree of
condemnation that civil liability lacks. 20 5 Civil liability conveys the message that

200. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 89, at 1510-12 (arguing that while expressive
theory does not arguefor expression, it addresses the link between thought and action: because
actions express thoughts and beliefs, actions may be evaluated by the normative value of
thoughts and the beliefs actions express).
201. Kahansupranote 11, at 619.
202. See Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law
Scholarship, 93 J. CRim. L. & CmINoLOG Y 467, 510 (2003) (arguing that the "norms school"

in criminal law theory "portrays society in a way that encourages a dangerously unwitting
acquiescence to populism"); id. at 590-91 (restating David Garland's reading of Durkheim as
warning against mistake of seeing ceremonies of punishment as necessarily coterminous with
society or productive of harmony).
203. See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories ofLaw: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA.
L. REv. 1363, 1417 (2000) (arguing that Kahan's "expressive" theory of criminal law is not a
genuine expressive theory of law because it explains only causal deterrent effects ofexpression,
not meaning).
204. See Kahan, supra note 11, at 619-21; Friedman, supra note 11, at 834 (arguing that
corporations are subject to condemnation because "they have independent identities in the
community, based upon attributes-identifiable personae and a capacity to express moral
judgments-that substantively distinguish them from their owners, managers and employees");
Lynch, supranote 11, at 50 ("The victims of corporate misconduct may reasonably feel that they
have been injured not (or at least, not only) by individual human actors, but by largely
unaccountable anonymous conglomerate institutions, in which individual actors were driven by
forces or incentives difficult to attribute to any one person."). But see CANE,supranote 88, at
146 ("Corporations are legal persons because they are responsible, not vice versa.").
205. See Kahan, supra note 11, at 621.
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corporate crime is merely priced and is therefore less effective at shaping preferences
against crime and inducing law-abiding behavior.2°
This kind of account is on the right track. If this Article accomplishes nothing else,
it ought to persuade the reader that no consequentialist evaluation of entity criminal
liability can succeed without accounting for the role of social norms about institutions
in the persistence and use of this criminal law doctrine. But saying that social welfare is
enhanced when people derive utility from condemning entities does not say much more
than that people are committed to the idea that an entity can be blameworthy and have
beliefs about what makes an entity deserve blame.2 °7 We need a fill analysis of the
social function of entity blame and clear specification of the justification for
accommodating the social practice of blaming institutions in legal practice.
It is unclear whether the expressive value of entity criminal liability would be its
ability to shape norms by conveying disapproval of certain forms of crime, or its ability
to satisfy popular demand for retribution against corporations and therefore to advance
general contentment or general respect for the law (that is, in Paul Robinson and John
Darley's phraseology, to accomplish "the utility of desert"). 20 8 Choosing objectives
matters; it will not only determine whether there ought to be a law, but also what the
law should say. A satisfactory account of entity criminal liability should demonstrate
how the law might optimally accomplish those objectives that the account holds are the
right ones.
For example, an account of expressive effects centered on the special meaning of
criminal condemnation, and its norm-conveying power, would contradict itself if it held
that entity blame should attach, as under respondeat superior, virtually anytime an
agent commits a crime related to the entity's affairs. 209 In any event, people simply do
not blame entities for their agents' crimes across the board in such a level way. To be
fair, almost no one has defended respondeat superior as the right liability rule. Because
the case seems so doubtful, presumably no expressive account would try.
Alternatively, an expressive objective offurthering popular contentment might have
some appeal. The criminal courts are a special locus for expression of norms that has
no substitute. 210 Given the much greater scope of criminal law as written than as

206. See id.
at 619; Friedman, supra note 11, at 854-55; GARLAND, supra note 58, at 33
(restating Emile Durkheim as finding, "These outbursts of common sentiment-concentrated
and organized in the rituals of punishment-produce an automatic solidarity, a spontaneous
reaffirmation of mutual beliefs and relationships which serve to strengthen the social bond.");
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 122, at 14-22 (arguing that criminal law is distinguished by its
preference-shaping influence).
207. See Kahan,supra note 11, at 622 ("[T]he punishment of corporations yields a complex
product consisting of both efficient behavioral incentives and appropriate social meanings" and
therefore "[m]aximizing social welfare when these two objectives conflict is likely to be
complicated.").
208. Robinson & Darley, supra note 17.
209. See O'Sullivan, supra note 59, at 37-41 (arguing that doctrine does not capture idea of
what constitutes entity conduct deserving condemnation); id. at 64 (arguing that overuse of
stigmatic sanctions reduces stigma).
210. Thurman Arnold put it this way in a celebrated essay (perhaps a tad strongly):
[T]he criminal trial overshadows all other ceremonies as a dramatization of the
values of our spiritual government, representing the dignity of the State as an
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presently enforced, this court-articulated expression may dwarf the importance of
expression in criminal legislation. 21 1 One could conceive of this expression in court as
a counterpart to the democratic function ofjury nullification. 212 Criminal cases, at least
when tried, give the people a means for participating in the norm-articulation of
governance.2 13
But this does not get us very far in justifying entity criminal liability, and certainly
not all the way home. The same could be said about any form of criminal case, and the
argument contains no limiting principle; its logical extension is mob justice. More
important, acknowledging this democratic function does not excuse us from the
necessity of justifying entity criminal liability. A baseless practice of institutional
blame would make sense only to a public mistaken about what the legal process was
saying, while the state knew of the mistake and chose to keep silent about it. This does
not sound like minimally reasoned governance.
An expressive defense of entity criminal liability might say that the practice is a
particularly influential way for criminal law to shape norms, perhaps because punishing
firms has a salience that punishing individuals lacks. In considering this claim, it is
important to distinguish between communicating what conduct is wrong and
communicating what conduct is wrong by variousmeans. Entity criminal liability adds
nothing on the former score because it does not define an independent category of
criminal behavior; enterprise liability is always derivative of an individual crime.
Entity liability's only addition to the set of the criminal law's behavioral preferences
would be a general message like "corporations are bad." That is hardly true, nor is it
useful to any polity committed to an economy based on open access to capitalregardless of whether people think it, or would conclude it from imposition of criminal
liability on firms.
That being said, entity criminal liability might have particular force, assuming it has
some heightened visibility, in driving home the messages that criminal law has chosen
to send.214 It certainly can have the more particular communicative force of identifying
enforcer of the law, and at the same time the dignity of the individual when he is
an avowed opponent of the State, a dissenter, a radical, or even a criminal.
ARNOLD, supra note 198, at 130.
211. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L. REv.
505,520-23 (2001) (arguing that the problem that expressive theories of criminal law have not
taken good account of wide variance between definition of law on the books and reality of law
as enforced is "severe, maybe devastating" for such theories).
212. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) ("Just as suffrage ensures the

people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure
their control in the judiciary."); Rachel E. Barkow, Rechargingthe Jury: The CriminalJury's
ConstitutionalRole in an Eraof MandatorySentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 46-84 (2003)
(mounting a detailed defense of "the criminal jury's structural power to check general criminal

laws-to nullify them in particular cases," including "the power to elaborate the governing
norms underlying criminal laws from the perspective of the community and its sense of moral
blameworthiness").
213. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as PoliticalParticipationAkin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REv. 203, 218-21 (1995).
214. See Cunningham et al., supra note 169, at 312-13 (finding that in an interview-based

study of managers in two industries, the most salient cases of criminal enforcement tended not to
be remembered specifically, but created a message of "implicit general deterrence" that caused
managers to conclude that violations inevitably lead to sanctions).
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conditions that make a firm responsible, and therefore blameworthy, for an agent's
crime. But recognizing this communicative function begins, not ends, inquiry. We need
to know, at least, what might be accomplished by sending such a message to
individuals and what shape the law and practice
of entity criminal liability should have
215
if the objective is to send such a message.
This Article's claim is that the bridge between entity blame and justification for
entity criminal liability, which expressive accounts have not yet successfully built, is
the link between the social practice of blaming institutions for individuals' wrongdoing
and the reality of institutional influence on individuals. A complete thesis of entity
criminal liability would hold that this connection both gives rise to the blaming impulse
and means that the blaming can alter behavior in ways that attack the causes of
institutional wrongdoing. With entity criminal liability, blame and utility go hand in
hand.
G. Costs

Legal imposition of entity blame inflicts costs that may undercut any benefits it
carries. These costs include collateral consequences to stakeholders like loss of
employment or equity; broader costs such as market effects from institutional failure;
and, at least if entity liability is imposed without regard to216blameworthiness, social
costs such as misinforming people about institutional fault.
Let us begin with a series of responses to the claim that entity criminal liability is
categorically intolerable because of costs. First, entity punishment does not punish
individuals like individual punishment. 217 It does not stigmatize people in the same way
and its sanctions, even in their severest pass-through forms, do not hurt in the same
way. Second, virtually all criminal punishment can inflict collateral consequences on

215. An additional form of criticism of expressive accounts of the criminal law is that they
fail to develop predictive behavioral models. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Limits ofBehavioral
Theories ofLaw and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603, 1627 (2000); Weisberg, supra note
201, at 468-74. These limitations do not undercut the explanatory force of expressive theory.
See Scott, supra,at 1625 (arguing that the minimum requirement for expressive theory should
be descriptive, even if not predictive, power). The problem with existing expressive accounts of
entity criminal liability is that they have not yet done enough explaining, not that they have been
examining the wrong questions. Khanna, for one, concedes that conveying messages can be a
legitimate function of law in the corporate context. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1531. He also
argues that it might be proper to account for the social utility of expressive condemnation, at
least in varying sanctions according to blameworthiness. Khanna, Top Management,supranote
10, at 1250-53. Khanna pulls back however, worrying that a program of sending messages may
be unnecessary where there is agreement that something is wrongful and that people may find
imposition of criminal liability on non-human entities "farcical," thereby weakening criminal
law's authority. Khanna, supra note 5, at 1531-32.
216. See, e.g., WuLIAMs, supra note 5, at 863 ("[A] fine imposed on the corporation is in
reality aimed against shareholders who are not.., responsible for the crime, i.e., is aimed
against innocent persons.").
217. See John Gardner, ChristopherKutz "sComplicity: Ethics andLawfora Collective Age,
114 ETmcs 827, 827 (2004) (book review) (arguing that the question of what turns actions of
individuals into action of them collectively "is not a question about complicity," that is, about
accessorial responsibility).
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others who stand close to the defendant. 218 Ordinarily we either accept this or see it as
a basis to mitigate, not dispense with, punishment. 219 Third, civil entity liability can
inflict equally severe collateral consequences, including the destruction of the entity. It
would be odd to say that government should refrain from all action that affects the
economic prospects of firms in ways that could harm stakeholders.
Fourth, it is not as if there is zero desert at the individual level. Group solidarity and
opportunity for control provide a basis for ascribing some responsibility to group
members for a transgression by one of their own. 220 Institutional stakeholders,
especially equity participants, enjoy benefits and assume the risk of loss.221 In addition,
we are not dealing with punishment without notice, in the ordinary sense. It would be
odd to think in terms of people being unfairly surprised by the appearance of criminal
enforcement, given that an individual crime is a precondition to considering entity
liability. 222 Fifth, entity blame may be justified if it is difficult to connect an individual

with the group harm, simply because only the institution can be blamed and the claims
of victims have "lexical priority" over the claims of non-faulty group members. 223

218. See FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 189 (1984).

94, at 50;

PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND

219. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996).
220. See FEINBERG, supranote 133, at 233-49 (arguing that group liability must satisfy same
justifications as individual vicarious liability, that is, group solidarity, prior notice, and
opportunity for control); KuTz, supra note 90, at 67-74, 122 (arguing that "participatory
intention," that is, how agents regard their own actions as contributing to a group outcome,
should be the basis for determining whether "prior social and ethical relationships" are
transformed into situations of group accountability); MAY, supra note 92, at 83 (discussing how
shared responsibility is justified in cases of value transformation within groups because group
members influence each other's behavior more within groups than outside them); LARRY MAY,
THE MORALITY OF GROUPs 65 (1987) ("In order to show that intentions can be attributed in a
limited sense to the corporation it is sufficient to show that the members of a corporation jointly
engaged in purposive conduct."); Levinson, supra note 98, at 424-28 (arguing that group
members who fail in delegated duty to prevent wrongdoing by other group members can be
viewed as morally responsible for that wrongdoing).
221. See FRENCH, supranote 218, at 188; see also Fisse,supra note 124, at 1168-76. But see
Kraakman, supra note 171, at 882 (arguing that penalizing firms into bankruptcy harms
participants, such as employees and contractors, who receive no risk premium and cannot
diversify their risk).
222. A different form of this objection holds that the entity itself has rights to fair treatment
because it has legal rights and thus it is wrong, "logically inconsistent," and breeds disrespect
for the law to punish corporations without regard to desert. See Laufer & Strudler, supranote
11, at 1290-95; but see Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, a corporation is 'an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law.' As such, it is not entitled to 'purely personal' guarantees" whose
'historic function' ... has been limited to the protection of individuals.") (quoting Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819), and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 779 n. 14 (1978)). This argument misdirects us down an anthropomorphic path,
which ends in the impossibility of mapping individual fault onto the entity. Any moral inquiry
loses coherence if it doesn't consider effects on the entity in terms of effects on persons.
223. KUTZ, supra note 90, at 192-93, 200-01; O'Sullivan, supra note 59, at 37-38
(identifying responses that innocents suffer from individual punishment, stakeholders realize
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While objections about the effects on individuals do not knock out entity criminal
liability altogether, the responses do not excuse us from considering unwanted
individual effects. Tolerance for injury to individuals should lessen as we consider
persons within the institution further removed from the crime and thus less responsible
for it even in a diffused sense. 224 A response at the institutional level should be
proportionate in that it should impact just those parts of the institution implicated in the
wrong.
The response to this position proceeds as follows. First, we might adopt a broad
view of the scope of responsibility. Since we are considering only the institutional
response, not response against individuals, we could justify the effects on individuals
who contribute in any way, even by inaction, to constituting institutional conditions. 25
To be sure, institutional blame could still affect people whose action or inaction
supplied literally no input into institutional arrangements.
Second and most important, this Article's finding that a legal practice of entity
criminal liability has most traction where reputation is at stake-that is, where legal
blame resonates socially-means that we are limited in how we can engineer sanctions.
We might be forced into a binary choice between a legal response or no legal response.
Assuming a case otherwise satisfies justifications for entity criminal liability, the
balance is likely to weigh in favor of legal response. Even if such a response might
trigger effects that are overly costly to certain persons, it is proportionate as to the
entity because it results in the deserved reputational sanction.
The third point follows directly: the proportionality objection is on the mark in
pointing to the need, to the extent possible, to limit a legal practice of institutional
blame to those cases in which its justifications apply.226 It does not make sense, for
example, to inflict costs on peripheral individuals where there is a single agent's crime
with no relationship to the institution other than the existence of an agency relationship.
If communicating about group failure is effective because it forces groups to reconsider
and reform group arrangements, such communication can be effective only to the
extent that a group did fail. The blaming function of entity criminal liability and the
fairness of the practice need not be at war.

benefits and assume risks of loss, stakeholders experience entity sanctions only in diluted form,
and stigma does not flow through).
224. KuTz, supranote 90, at 159-62 (arguing that the degree of culpability, as measured by
the responses of victims and outsiders, lessens from agents at the core of activity who "intend
the collective end" to agents "whose roles are merely participatory at the periphery"); see also
Gardner, supra note 216, at 829 (arguing that Kutz should have developed more exacting
standards for differentiating degrees of complicity).
225. John Gardner argues that "complicity liability," in contrast to vicarious liability, is a
type of "personal" liability because it is based on something one did or failed to do. Gardner,
supra note 217, at 829. Collateral consequences flowing through to individuals from entity
blame might be considered, and defended, as a lesser form of complicity liability.
226. See O'Sullivan, supranote 59, at 36-37 (arguing that parsimony says that unfair flowthrough effects of entity criminal liability should be minimized by limiting liability to cases in
which firm actually is culprit).
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H. Conclusions andEmpiricalQuestions

To summarize, as a matter of social fact sometimes institutions do produce crime
and sometimes people do blame institutions for that. There is good reason to think the
popular blaming intuition is tied to the reality of institutional effects on individualsthat is, that blame tends to arise and be strongest not anytime somebody commits a
crime on the job, but when the institution played a role in the offense.
227 Empirical work,
perhaps at least in survey form, might be able to bolster the point.
Numerous reasons suggest that legal process, and particularly criminal legal
process, adds unique and strong communicative force to any societal conclusion about
institutional fault. 228 Not surprisingly, over the roughly 100 years of its life the de facto
legal practice of imposing criminal liability on firms has grown much more fault-based
than the broad (and thin) de jure rule. At a minimum, more empirical work on
reputational effects, and particularly their interaction with legal process, would be
needed before concluding that people, including firm managers, simply have been
misguided in worrying about the effects of imposing criminal liability on firms.229
There is good reason to believe that reputational harm to firms can flow through to
individuals in ways that can operate like sanctions, altering behavior and encouraging
compliance efforts. Very little empirical work has been done on this dynamic and more
would certainly be beneficial. 230 As with the link between institutional production of
crime and social blame of institutions, it is probable that the flow-through of
reputational effects is tied to the reality of institutional production of crime. The more a
given crime is attributable to an institution, the more others will tend to conclude
something significant from the event about individuals not directly culpable in the
offense but who may have contributed to the problem by virtue of their contributions to
the institution. In turn, to the extent they have control, institutional actors will seek to
operate firms to prevent instances of wrongdoing in an effort to avoid personal
reputational consequences.
Finally, the effects of entity criminal liability in altering individual behavior cannot
be completely replicated in a system of civil liability, are more particular than a simple
assertion of expressive function suggests, and are not categorically outweighed by
possible unwanted costs. However, entity criminal liability should be tailored to its

227. Cf PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995); TOM R TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW

(1990).
228. It is a mistake to think that reputational effects must be either independent of legal
process or entirely dependent on it. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, OptimalSentencesfor White
CollarCriminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409,417 n.25 (1980) (arguing that criminalizing nonreprehensible conduct could not dilute stigma of law because people would need to stigmatize
for non-legal reasons for such effects to be possible).
229. If the criminal process proves impermeable to such analysis, a useful comparison might
be to SEC enforcement where data is likely to be more ample. We do not fully understand
whether the reputational impact of an SEC enforcement case stems from prediction of ultimate
sanctions, prediction of parallel civil actions, a canary-in-the-coal-mine effect, some
combination of these, or other factors.
230. The only study I have found, which is largely anecdotal and interview-based, is FIssE&
BRArrHWAITE, supra note 141.
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purpose in order to minimize unwanted effects and maximize its influence. We can
now turn to that imperative.
III. LAW OF ENTrrY CRIMINAL LIABIwrY
The implications of this Article's findings about the function of criminal enterprise
liability are both simple and problematic. They are simple because the conclusion that
the law of entity criminal liability should be much more narrowly tailored to the fact of
institutional responsibility-in order to maximize desired effects and reduce unwanted
ones-follows without much further effort. The implications are problematic because,
as prior evaluations of the law of entity criminal liability explicitly or implicitly
demonstrate, there is no first-best rule of genuine institutional fault.
This Part thus will offer two concrete products of this Article's findings. First, I will
suggest a move in the direction of second-best rules for institutional fault, namely more
robust application of the existing doctrinal element of the agent's intention to benefit
the firm. Second, I will consider how the necessity of second-best rules leaves a
residual role for enforcement practice in determining the scope and effects of entity
criminal liability. Entity criminal liability illustrates that enforcement practices alone,
with only loose regard to sanctions, can be normatively influential.
A. Inadequacy of Respondeat Superior
By this Article's lights, respondeat superior is grossly overbroad since it has almost
nothing to do with the social practice of institutional blame. The claim here has been
that the legal process and the social practice of faulting the institution together produce
the criminal entity sanction, in the form of reputational impact. The legal rule is not an
afterthought. Logically, the more tightly the rule is fastened to institutional
blameworthiness, the more that the practice of entity criminal liability will retain its
justification, its bite, and its utility as a means of education. The rule functions as an
input to that particular form of institutional blame that expresses itself through the
23
courts. I
A rule deeming virtually all crimes committed by institutional agents in institutional
settings to be institutional crimes is easy to apply but plainly does not fit with any
persuasive account of the relationship between institutional effects and individual
conduct. Much of the uncertainty about entity liability's place in criminal law may
result from mixed messages. On one hand, the law says firms are virtually always
answerable for their agents' crimes, almost without regard to the facts. On the other
hand, the social practice of evaluating a fum's real responsibility has exerted a
continual pressure on the criminal practice that has pushed enforcers to select entity
criminal cases on more discriminating grounds.232

231. See Robinson, supra note 122, at 212-13 (arguing that when expansion of criminal
law's regulatory reach blurs distinctions between civil and criminal systems, morally
communicative force of criminal law is weakened, perversely undermining utilitarian
objectives).
232. See Laufer & Strudler, supranote 11, at 1299 ("Prosecutorial and sentencing guidelines

reflect a growing consensus that vicarious fault, and its many variants, fail to capture the harm
caused by corporate crime or the fault of an offending organization.").
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Prior accounts of entity criminal liability often appear to evaluate the purpose of
criminalentity liability on the assumption that it has to be based in ordinary agency
liability. The effects of entity criminal liability might look different, and therefore
require different evaluation, under a system that genuinely assessed firms' roles in their
agents' criminal conduct. At a minimum, a responsibility-based system of law would
clarify, and strengthen, any messages that result from imposing criminal liability on
firms.
Feedback effects are likely. A tighter, better-justified doctrine of entity criminal
liability is apt to begin settling theoretical controversy, then policy controversy, over
the practice of imposing criminal liability on firms. Eliminating confusion about why
particular firms deserve criminal liability and about why the criminal law includes
enterprise liability will make impositions of entity criminal liability clearer and more
influential in their reputational effects. The doctrine would enjoy both greater support
and greater influence.
B. Unavailabilityof a First-BestRule
Unfortunately, under existing technologies of responsibility assessment, there is no
optimal means of assessing firm fault. We do not have the slightest concept of how one
could judge a firm to have committed a crime in the absence of an agent crime.233 Some
form of vicarious liability is unavoidable. Efforts to overlay forms of firm personhood
on top of agency liability have been unsuccessful. 234 Anthropomorphisms and
metaphors mistake personhood (rather than responsibility) as a precondition to legal
fault. They are a reactive artifact of the traditional criticisms of entity criminal liability
that maintained that criminal law's principle of mens rea does not fit firms.235
More to the point, personhood concepts do not work. For example, one proposal
says firms should be criminally sanctioned when their "ethos," that is, a "corporation's
characteristic spirit or prevalent tone of sentiment," encouraged agents to commit the
crime. 236 Another says that actus reus should be found by considering "whether given
the size, complexity, formality, functionality, decision making process, and structure of
the corporate organization, the agents' acts are fairly said to be the actions of the
corporation"; and that mens rea should be found by considering "whether the
corporation purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently engaged in the illegal act,"

233. Over a decade ago, a leading study on this subject concluded that no theory of
organizational action could be derived as a basis for principles of entity criminal liability. FISSE
& BRArrIwAITE, supranote 94, at 122. The more we appreciate the complexities of institutional
influence on the individual and the more we embed the legal practice within a social practice of
blame that responds to certain forms and results of that influence, the more remote a first-best
solution looks.
234. See Lederman, supranote 62,at 689-90 ("[T]he variations of the model grant different
weight and emphasis to such features as structure and hierarchy, size and complexity, policy and
action, and particularly modes of management, decision making and monitoring processes in the
corporation in question.").
235. See MAY, supranote 92, at 20, 23 ("[G]roups do not 'acquire a body, a tangible form,
and constitute a reality in their own right"' and do not have "independent ontological standing,
independent of the members of the group in relationships.").
236. See Bucy, supranote 11, at 1099-1123.
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that is, "whether the average corporation of like size, complexity, functionality, and
27
structure, given the circumstances presented, would have the required state of mind.", 3
It is extremely difficult to see what trial and appellate review of enterprise cases would
look like under such legal rules.
At the same time, metaphoric approaches miss the import of ascribing institutional
responsibility. As we have seen, this form of blame does not construct something
nonexistent (a unitary nonhuman character) in order to have something to blame. 238 If
that were the case, inquiry into entity criminal liability might have ended long ago with
the argument that it is an irrational practice lacking empirical foundation, in the nature
of medieval "deodand." Anthropomorphic methods also fail at239describing the
functional relationship between an institution and an agent's crime.
Not surprisingly, most suggestions for reform of entity criminal liability have
proposed second-best proxies, rather than full models of institutional responsibility.
But such efforts tend to start from insufficiently focused conceptions of the
justifications for criminal entity liability. For example, some argue that management
complicity defines institutional fault. 240 Management can serve as a proxy for the entity

but cannot replace it. 241 The management proxy works poorly because groups can

237. Laufer & Strudler, supra note 11, at 1309-10.
238. See CANE, supra note 88, at 150, 168 (arguing that one can speak of corporate culture
or actions of a corporation only by attributing human conduct to the entity--otherwise, such talk
is "meaningless anthropomorphism"; by treating responsibility as a function of personality,
metaphoric approaches leave gaps with social practices, which view the personality of groups as
a function of responsibility).
239. Compare id. at 148 (arguing that because law reflects the paradigm of individual
responsibility, it is necessary to attribute human conduct and mental states to entities in order to
allocate legal responsibility, but these are "deeming" rules, not reflections of metaphysical
conclusions about "the mind of the corporation" or "the corporation's conduct") with MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 624 (1997) ("It ...
makes
sense to seek the meaning of 'persons' and its related terms ('action', 'reasons') in terms of the
facts that must be true if these concepts are to be correctly employed" because "the concepts
employed in discussing all such questions are not empty labels for a moral or legal conclusion
reached on other grounds, or on no grounds at all; they are concepts having a descriptive and
explanatory function, no matter what other expressive, prescriptive, or ascriptive functions they
may serve in contexts such as those of responsibility assessment.").
240. The Model Penal Code is the leading authority for this proposition. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.07 (1985) (holding that strict master-servant liability applies only to regulatory
offenses where legislature has specified corporate liability; defense of due diligence by high
management to prevent the offense defeats prosecution in such cases; liability otherwise attaches
only where offense "was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated"
by high management or directors); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193,
230 (1991); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime, supra note 6, at 1257-58; but see

Coffee, supra, at 195-96 (discussing how control of internal policing may not be sufficient
justification for criminal versus civil liability); Lynch, supra note 11, at 52 (arguing that a
corporation should be held responsible "only when no individual can be proven culpable, or
where the individuals who can be punished are insufficiently important to bear the weight of
stigma appropriately attaching to the harmfulness or offensiveness of the wrong").
241. See Khanna, Top Management, supra note 10, at 1232-41; see also Fisse, supra note
124, at 1187 (finding that management fault does not necessarily correspond with corporate
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commit crimes without the direct involvement of leaders.242 It is easy to imagine
serious harm produced by lower-level employees (such as telemarketing salespeople
who defraud) without the knowledge of high managers, but explainable by institutional
norms. 243 At the same time, managers can help produce a crime (say, by driving
telemarketing salespeople to produce unattainable revenues) even when they do not
participate in, or even know of, the offense. And, of course, a senior manager might
deviate and commit a serious offense on the job without giving any reason to ascribe
institutional responsibility. Aberrant behavior that happens to transpire in an
institutional setting, even if it needs such a setting in order to be rewarded, is not the
concern of a practice of blaming institutions.
Likewise, reliance on formalized institutional policy, controls, and practices fits
poorly with institutional responsibility. 244 If an organization formalizes practices, that
may strengthen the claim that those practices bear on the crime's relationship to the
institution but by itself will not say whether practices affected the crime. 245 A firm

might formalize practices in part to mask that it does not really practice them, or use
them for that purpose ex post even if it did not design them for it ex ante. Indeed, there
is reason to doubt the effectiveness of the modem emphasis under the United States
having compliance
Sentencing Guidelines on rewarding corporations simply for 246
programs. It may be mostly a boon to compliance professionals.
Other approaches-including attribution of negligence to firms 247 and a recent
24 8
proposal to narrow criminal liability for firms by altering evidentiary rules fault, so management-based standards are just another form of vicarious liability).
242. See CANE, supranote 88, at 157 (arguing that the doctrine of"identification" of senior
management with the entity makes entity liability under-inclusive).
243. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 154, at 3 (finding that involvement of lower-level
employees outside the top management team was a precondition to many corporate crimes
examined in an empirical study); see also Khanna, Top Management,supranote 10, at 1232-41
(arguing that high management involvement is an inefficient measure of internal monitoring
efforts).
244. See, e.g., Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED

ETHIcs, supranote 88,

at 133.
245. See Fisse, supra note 124, at 1191 (arguing that requiring proof of policy would
exclude far too many cases of corporate fault).
246. See Krawiec, supranote 14, at 21-27 (reviewing empirical studies); Coffee, supranote
239, at 229 (discussing how management may use monitoring systems as an insurance policy to
escape liability while still pressuring underlings to violate law); Langevoort, supra note 114, at
83-103 (arguing that social and cognitive psychology theory suggests that the law's emphasis
on compliance efforts may be ineffective for a variety of reasons, including its tendency to
overestimate managers' detection abilities, tendency to underestimate costs of third-party
monitoring, and bias in favor of excessive monitoring).
247. See, e.g., MAY, supranote 92, at 85-96 (arguing that the given act should be ascribed
to the corporation if an employee acts pursuant to a decision by "high-ranking managers," which
will often take the form of "a decision not to interfere or effectively to acquiesce" in
circumstances where a manager has a duty to prevent the employee from committing harm).
Negligence can also be under-inclusive. For example, the idea of "reactive corporate fault"
would impose criminal blame when an entity fails to act preventively and correctively in
response to an agent delict. FISSE & BRArrHwArrE, supra note 94, at 48-49. People resent
entities that stonewall and fail to redress harm, but that is only one reason for resentment of
entities and it arises only in some cases. Entities can be palpably at fault at or before the agent's
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similarly fail to define institutional production of crime. Because they do not accord
with the social practice of blaming institutions, they do not support maintenance of a
separate criminal regime of enterprise liability.
C. A Second-Best Alternative
1. Reshaping Existing Law
A more promising approach would be to turn back to the prevailing law of entity
criminal liability itself, and consider how it might be thickened. Agent mens rea,
consistent with longstanding practice, could be useful past the point of the agent's own
liability, but not in the way long believed. Imputation of agent mens rea to the firm is
only a legal device, a fiction that has nothing to do with firm responsibility. It is just a
means of mobilizing criminal law against entities.
Agent mens rea might reveal the firm's influence in a different way, that is, through
the agent's mental state not toward her own actions but toward thefirm. If an agent
commits a crime with the understanding that her crime furthers the purposes of her
institution, it is more likely that the agent's conduct is explained by institutional
influence. 249 The proxy of agent mens rea of course is imperfect because the agent's
understanding is only evidentiary of institutional influence and is subject to limitations
of mistake, incomplete information, lack of self-awareness, and so on. However, the
proxy gets substantially closer to the fact of institutional influence than existing law or
prior proposals do, chiefly because this proxy is workable. Law is equipped to examine
the human mental state. Circumstantial evidence can paint a picture of a person's

criminal act. Id. at 162; see also CANE, supra note 88, at 37 (arguing that the idea of reactive
corporate fault, as based on rewarding good behavior, does not fit with the traditional
framework of criminal process as a mode of punishing bad behavior). Lastly in this vein,
"flagrant organizational indifference," that is, willful blindness, does not bridge the chasm
between a criminal law founded on human free will and nonhuman entities because intentional
lack of knowledge is the linchpin fixing willful blindness to the criminal law. Compare
Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 62, at 218-27 ("If an organization deliberately
compartmentalizes information to escape the knowledge that might lead to its conviction, then
collecting the knowledge scattered throughout its employees and utilizing it against the
organization properly imputes liability.") with United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th
Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("[R]equired state of mind differs from positive knowledge only so far as
necessary to encompass a calculated effort to avoid the sanctions of the statute while violating
its substance.").
248. See Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 176 (suggesting an expansion of attorney-client
privilege for corporations, coupled with a recognition of corporate privilege against selfincrimination that could be overcome only with a probable cause warrant, as means of reducing
the frequency of imposing criminal liability on firms, in order to reduce expected sanctions to
offset over-deterrence caused by the imposition of reputational sanctions). This proposal to
modify procedure may be a third-best substitute for narrowing substantive law and could sharply
reduce the ability of the government to use firms to detect and punish individual wrongdoing.
249. See Krawiec, supranote 14, at 27-40 (arguing that theories that treat crime in entities
solely as an agency cost confuse "organizational misconduct," which is meant to benefit firms,
with "occupational misconduct," which is meant to benefit the agent and may victimize the
principal).
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attitude, and a person's attitude can tell us much about external conditions that gave
rise to that attitude.
Existing law has a mostly dormant feature that ought to be doing some of this work.
An entity cannot be convicted of a crime under respondeat superior unless the
offending agent acted with the intent to benefit the entity. 250 This is a requirement of
vicarious agency liability in tort and has been given a slightly stronger gloss in its
criminal form. 251 But courts have rendered the element virtually meaningless. The only
significant decision rejecting entity criminal liability on this ground involved a secret
theft and diversion of oil belonging to a petroleum company by employees in cahoots
with a third party with whom they shared the spoils. 252 More emblematic and recent is
United States v. Sun-DiamondGrowers of California,253 in which the court found no
difficulty imposing entity criminal liability where a single employee, in concert with an
outsider, diverted corporate funds to help retire the campaign debts of a government
official. What was more, the entity's convictions included two for wire fraud on the
theory that it incurred criminal liability when its agent, by diverting the entity's money
254
and hiding his diversion, breached his duty to provide honest services to the entity!
Sun-Diamond deserves a chuckle, but the truth is that any theory of an intent to
benefit, however slight, is enough. (In Sun Diamond, it was thought to help the
company for its lobbyist to cultivate his friendship with the government official.) Cases
of pure theft and embezzlement seem to be the only ones ruled out. This does not have
to be so. The law is capable of handling problems of mixed motive. That is not to

250. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399,406--07 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gold, 743
F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir.
1982); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
251. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (Tentative Draft, No. 5,2004) (stating
the principle inversely: "An employee's act is not within the scope of employment when it
occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any
purpose of the employer.") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers
of Cal., 138 F.3d 961,970 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (arguing that in a civil case of vicarious liability,
a showing of apparent authority may be sufficient without regard to agent's intent to further
principal's interest).
252. Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 122-25.
253. 138 F.3d at 961.
254. To be fair, the Sun-Diamond court acknowledged the deep contradiction here, but
defended it on the grounds that imputation of agent mens rea is a fiction with no purpose other
than to encourage entity monitoring, and courts are free to impute it without any other basis. Id.
at 971.
255. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87
(1977) (holding that in determining whether an employee was terminated for a constitutionally
impermissible reason, the court should require the employee to show that the prohibited reason
was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor and then permit the employer to establish that it

would have terminated the employee even in the absence ofprotected conduct). I do not mean to
suggest in any broader sense that an analogy to employment law holds. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §
1221 (e) (2000) (overruling Mt. Healthy for normative reasons by requiring plaintiff to prove
that impermissible purpose was only "contributing factor" and requiring defendant to disprove

but-for causation by clear and convincing evidence); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (noting that it is difficult to determine
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say that the task is easy. But it is not hopeless, any more than it is hopeless to
determine whether a defendant had the purpose of obstructing justice when she
destroyed a document, or understood the nature of what she was doing when she lit her
own house on fire while suffering from acute depression.
An important first step toward deeper examination of agent mental state, for the
purpose of inferring institutional influence, would be to give real meaning to the
element of intent to benefit. For imposition of criminal agency liability, courts could
require the government to prove that the agent's primary purpose in committing the
crime was to benefit the entity.25 6 From this, we could infer (though this need not be a
component of the decision rule) 25 7 that the agent acted with the understanding that the
institution would favor her conduct and thus was under its influence.258
Such a rule would be far from a complete solution since it would leave many cases
in which misguided, or "rogue," agents took it upon themselves to advance institutional
interests criminally and without external suggestion. However, it would get started
toward more careful consideration of the importance of agent mens rea to entity
liability and it might lead to further rules for determining agent purpose, motive, intent,
and their effects. It would eliminate the many cases of entity criminal liability that have
involved only individual criminality that happened to take place in an institutional
setting. The self-dealing executive, the embezzling stock broker, the lone obstructionist
shredding evidence of her own crime, the inside trader, the deceptive salesperson
seeking to pad her commissions, the gratuity-giver diverting assets for the benefit of an
official friend, and the like would be cases for individual liability alone.
2. Some Objections
Critics of such a reform approach likely will argue either that it does too little or
that it does too much. It does too little, it might be said, because it does not deal with a
problem always present in the intent-to-benefit element of respondeat superior: in
reality, agents do not act eitherto benefit themselves or their masters; benefitting the
master is always good for the agent because good performance is generally rewarded.
Rational agents seeking to benefit themselves will always act to benefit their masters.

whether legislature or administrative body was motivated by a "dominant" or "primary"
purpose).
256. See United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the trial court (unnecessarily) instructed jury that agent must have acted "for the
purpose primarilyof benefiting the corporation") (emphasis in original).
257. Cf Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecisionRules, 90 VA. L. REv. 1,9-13 (2004)
(describing decision rules as means by which courts enforce norms (in Berman's case,
constitutional ones) that for epistemic reasons cannot be replicated in the form of legal
doctrine).
258. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1958) (concluding
that if the agent's act "is done with a view of furthering the master's business, of doing
something for the master, then the expectation or hope of a benefit, whether direct or indirect,
makes the act that of the principal"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2004) ("When an employee commits a tort with the sole intention of
furthering the employee's own purposes, and not any purpose of the employer, it is neither fair

nor true-to-life to characterize the employee's action as that of a representative of the
employer.").
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Thus even a substantial intent to benefit the firm may say little about the influence of a
firm on its agent.
Such a thin account of agent motivation conflicts with the wealth of material
discussed in this Article explaining how organizational influence on people is complex
and context-dependent. For someone who believes that institutional influence is not
potent or even real-that is, that a given individual will exercise the same rationally
self-interested choices consistent with her set of preferences regardless of institutional
setting-this Article's entire approach to entity criminal liability would seem mistaken.
I concede that if institutional influence on the individual is a fallacy, then entity
criminal liability might have no purpose.
Of course there will be hard cases. Perhaps emblematic are cases of financial
statement fraud by managers of publicly traded corporations. Falsifying a company's
numbers to boost its stock price can benefit both managers and shareholders (and
particularly managers who hold shares), but can severely harm shareholders too,
especially those lacking the knowledge necessary
to make exit decisions before the
25 9
fraud is revealed and the stock price plummets.
The difficult problem of fraud-on-the-market cases suggests a need to develop
proper baselines for measuring an agent's intent to benefit her firm. One might view an
agent's parity of self-interest with the short-term interests of the firm, but not with the
long-term interests of the firm, as a case of self-interest, not firm interest. 26° This might
be a surprising conclusion, but it makes more sense if we recall the point that
reputational sanctions are likely to be most effective at the margins, as applied to actors
who care most about reputation and invest most in guarding it. In any case ofpervasive
accounting fraud, culpable managers have chosen to pursue a course of action that, if
discovered, will reveal the firm to be a fake. Their motivation is solely to prevent
detection, not to protect reputation in the event their conduct is discovered.
Alternatively, there are two arguments that this Article's reform proposal does too
much. First, relying on a strong element of the agent's intent to benefit the firm will
exclude some troubling cases that many might want to treat criminally. Suppose a sea
captain, whose employer knows him to be a drunkard but takes no action, runs a
petroleum tanker aground, despoiling an entire ecosystem. He had no intent to benefit
his employer when he got drunk while on watch. But his employer looks awfully
blameworthy (institutionally so) for having, at the least, recklessly countenanced
employee recklessness, causing grave harm. We might see in a similar light a case, for
example, of an investment house that ignores repeated red flags and instances of
embezzlement by its own brokers.
Such cases of failure to supervise rogues clearly involve breakdown or
abandonment in internal policing. But do they really representfirm crimes in the same
sense as a case like Andersen, or the simple example of the delivery company with

259. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, VicariousLiabilityfor FraudonSecurities

Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 693-94 (arguing that fraud on the
market is a product of agency costs when managers perceive themselves to be in the last period
of employment).
260. See id. at 704-20 (arguing against any form of enterprise liability in cases of fraud on
the market on the grounds that it does not deter such conduct better than individual liability and
that sanctions in such cases generally only shift the loss from one group of "innocent"

shareholders to another).
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incentives that induce its drivers to careen around recklessly and strike pedestrians?
This is a hard question. One might say no, on the grounds that even really bad
negligence resulting in mass harm belongs and can be handled in the tort system and
that, at the level of the firm, the wrong in these cases is only negligence, even if the
agent committed a crime.
Or one might say yes, on the ground that there is no difference in terms of entity
blameworthiness between a firm inducing its agents to offend and sitting on its
collective hands knowing they are offending or are about to offend. Both cases, it
might be argued, involve a link between the firm and the conduct that both explains the
impulse to blame the firm and makes that blaming more likely to alter the behavior of
firm agents. If egregious nonfeasance cases are best seen in this light, one might want
to supplement the criminal liability standard with allowance for cases of reckless
monitoring of agent wrongdoing.
Second, one might complain that the proposal here does too much because it would
eliminate many cases from a system that has developed a strong framework of
incentives for firms to police and punish wrongdoing. What happens to the
exhaustively treated problem, found everywhere from the United States Sentencing
Guidelines to academic commentary, of how to calibrate entity criminal liability's rules
26
'
and sanctions to optimize use of the firm as an instrument for control of individuals?
Would narrowing entity criminal liability sap strength from that system?
If fining firms to induce compliance is the only purpose ofa enterprise liability, then
there probably is no reason to have a separate criminal system. Sanctions can be
extensively calibrated in any set of civil liability systems, regulatory and private, one
might want to construct. If one nonetheless wants to retain a criminal liability system
because its stronger impact provides special leverage in encouraging firms' compliance
efforts, then a narrower, more responsibility-based criminal system will only increase
that leverage. Its messages will say more, so firms will fear its effects more. In
addition, in the criminal cases that remained under a narrower liability standard, one
could still tinker with court-imposed sanctions to optimize incentives.

261. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2004). But see United States v.
Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are
unconstitutional as binding law; they are merely advisory). For a leading analysis, see Arlen &
Kraakman, supra note 71, at 735-41 (advocating the efficiency of a composite regime of strict
liability with mitigation of sanctions to credit policing); see also id.at 691 n. 12 (choosing not to
address whether corporate liability should be civil or criminal); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of CorporateCriminalLiability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (discussing
how master-servant liability might discourage an entity from monitoring since monitoring will
uncover (and thereby make more likely to be proven) wrongs the entity could not have
prevented); Arlen & MacLeod, supranote 171, at 136 (arguing that vicarious liability should be
based on the master's "capacity ... to structure[] its relationships with the agent to allow it to
influence the agent's behavior" because the existing "control" test encourages masters to
structure relationships with servants in order to avoid liability); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of
CorporateFault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of CorporateMens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REv. 355,
403-05 (1999) (advocating the efficiency of strict liability not just as to master-servant
connection but also as to the servant's mental state, coupled with inquiry into agent mens rea at
sentencing, to aggravate or mitigate a baseline sanction, on the ground it would enhance entity
control of agents who harm unintentionally).
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Even a strong requirement of proof of an agent's intent to benefit the entity would
leave many existing cases of entity criminal liability unaffected. More often than not,
the offender in the firm setting who pursues criminal means does so to reap advantage
for both herself and the firm. At least some of these cases will not really be about how
institutional conditions spawned criminality. No matter what legal standard is pursued
for entity criminal liability, the lack of a first-best rule will leave a gap between the
scope of liability and the objective to communicate about group wrongdoing.
Enforcers should confront such a gap by selecting cases in which the imposition of
entity criminal liability will address institutional production of crime. On this Article's
account, those will be the cases in which reputation is at stake. Prosecutorial guidelines
ought to counsel the selection of cases that will convey the message that a serious
institutional lapse that produces crime is deviant. Prosecutors should consider whether
an entity criminal prosecution will impose a reputational sanction that is roughly
commensurate with the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the entity's role in
producing the harm.262
Reputational sanction is not an end. It is an indicator of social meaning and assists
in the educative function of criminal law. Reputational sanction is also the bite in
criminal entity liability that causes credible enforcement threats to encourage firms to
disclose and rectify wrongdoing by their agents. If entity criminal liability did not
impose a unique sanction, and certainly if enforcers never actually inflicted that
sanction, firms would operate under much less powerful incentives to control
individual behavior. Thus, achieving instrumental benefits of entity criminal liability
and tailoring its scope to firms' true blameworthiness go hand in hand.
Responsibility-based enforcement practices would be liable to eliminate many
cases, since over ninety percent of entity criminal cases have involved privately or
closely held firms, many of which likely experience little reputational effects. 26 3 The
fewer prosecutions and the more socially important the defendants in those cases, the
more meaning an institutional conviction will carry and the more reputational sting it
will inflict. The more meaningful and punitive the institutional conviction grows, the
more prosecutors will tend to reserve it for the most important cases.26

262. Current guidelines do not include this consideration. See Thompson Memo, supranote
60, at 3.
263. Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento, EmpiricalEvidence and the Legal Doctrineof
CorporateCriminalLiability, 29 Am.J.CRiM. L. 341, 365 (2002) (discussing an early report
that found ninety-seven percent of firms sentenced under United States Sentencing Guidelines
were privately or closely held); see also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 154, at 9-10
(explaining that according to the United States Sentencing Commission, during years 1984 to
1990, only about twenty publicly held corporations per year were convicted of a crime). It is
hard to see the justification for entity criminal liability in cases of sole or near-sole
proprietorships. Assuming that entity liability is implicated because of the owner's crime, the
entity effectively represents just another personal asset of the offender. Individual sanctions can
be structured to reach corporate assets and the marginal reputational effect on an offender of
also prosecuting the offender's own company is apt to be negligible.
264. See KuTz, supra note 90, at 113 ("The most important and far-reaching harms and
wrongs of contemporary life are the products of collective actions, mediated by social and
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With entity liability, criminal enforcement is highly normative by itself, not just
because of legal sanctions that may follow. This is not a novel insight. We have long
spoken about how an indictment or conviction makes a statement, inflicting
reputational or psychological harm or expressing values. 265 But we have underexplored the mechanism of this production. As a consequence, we do not have a good
understanding of how to trigger what we could2 call "enforcement sanctions," to control
them, or to measure or interpret their effects. 6
Entity criminal liability is a case in point because when we strip it down to its
justifiable purpose, we are left with a law that is influential far more by its invocation
than through the sanctions it authorizes. There are other cases in which enforcement
alone sanctions, and further such problems for analysis. People have reputations too,
and the criminal law's public cases are by no means limited to entity prosecutions,
Sometimes not only do indictment, trial or plea, and conviction impose distinct costs,
but those costs can surpass those of statutory sanctions.267 Undeniably, enforcers often
act in such contexts because enforcement has sanctioning effects. 268 Such motives can
pose problems, but cabined within the right conception of the enforcer's mandate they
can produce expressive benefits.
Reputation is not enforcement's only capital. Consider, for example, areas where
levels of compliance are opaque, such as falsehood or fraud in the legal process or the
financial markets. Enforcement in such contexts may signal to others who are inclined
to comply, even if only weakly, for normative reasons or for benefits of reciprocity,
that the state is serious about deterring free riding, and thereby discourage defection.
We might ask whether the effect of such enforcement signaling is decoupled from the
actual performance of deterrence among putative free riders, thus explaining the state's
sometimes overblown expressions of devotion
to deterrence. In other words,
269
enforcement might be a powerful heuristic.
institutional structures."); see also ARNOLD, supra note 197, at 161 (arguing that the view that
rare cases, however spectacular, are of minor importance because they do not stand out
statistically is based on the "assumption that courts are business institutions" which "lose[s]
sight of the dramatic functions of the court").
265. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 334 (1996) ("Opprobrium attaches to
conviction of those [crimes punishable by sentences of more than six months] regardless of the
length of the actual sentence imposed, and the stigma itself is enough to entitle the defendant to
a jury.").
266. The problem is how the enforcement act alone sanctions and thereby communicates, not
the problem of how sanctions might be tailored to exploit expressive effects. See, e.g., Skeel,
supra note 173, at 1823 n.48 (citing materials on shaming penalties).
267. Public corruption and serious crime in major financial markets come immediately to
mind but there will be other settings. See, e.g., John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts
on Shaming, "White Collar" Criminals,and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L.
REv. 1047, 1053-55 (2000) (briefly naming ways in which enforcement process can affect
targets and defendants).
268. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
PoliticalEconomy ofPretextualProsecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583 (2005).
269. Dan Kahan begins to describe this problem in recent work. See Dan M. Kahan, The
Logic ofReciprocity: Trust, CollectiveAction, andLaw, 102 MICH. L. REv. 71 (2003); Dan M.
Kahan, Trust, CollectiveAction, andLaw, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333 (2001). The implications ofhow
enforcement practices normatively operate should be explored in specific contexts beyond
Kahan's observations that crackdowns may perversely undermine compliance by signaling
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CONCLUSION

Perhaps surprisingly, this Article has both embraced entity criminal liability and
argued for cutting back on its presence in the legal system. The two agendas are linked.
Properly understood, entity criminal liability need not be an instance of
"overcriminalization," that is, another strand in an expanding web of criminal law that
is encroaching on civil means of regulating behavior. At its core, entity criminal
liability instantiates a social practice of blaming institutions for crime that is
characteristic of criminal law in its morally infused message, and in the stigmatic
impact of that message.
That blaming, channeled through the legal system, can yield beneficial effects by
altering organizational behavior. But such benefits will flow optimally only if law is
shaped to convey blame, and ifenforcers appreciate the normative impact oftheir own
actions. With some modest reforms, we might finally begin to complete after a century
the unfinished work of situating enterprise liability in the criminal law.

widespread defection, or may fortify trust if transparently directed at free riders widely expected
to resist incentives to reciprocate.

